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RECLASSIFICATION RISKS FOR COMPENSATION PAID BY
SAND C CORPORATIONS TO SHAREHOLDER-EMPLOYEES
I.

INTRODUCTION
A.

CHOICE OF ENTITY STATISTICS

Although LLCs have gained increasing popularity over the last 10-15 years, the
number of entities taxed as S corporations still exceeds the number of entities
taxed as partnerships for federal tax purposes, and it is projected to stay that way
for the foreseeable future, as set forth in the table below published by the IRS
(Document 6292, Office of Research, Analysis and Statistics, Fiscal Year Retum
Projections for the United States: 2013-2020, Rev. June, 2014):

B.

' 0 fE ll t't
St at'IS t'ICS R etmrd'm2 Ch OICe
HV
2015
2018
2013
(Projected)
(Projected)
(Actual)

2021
(Projected)

Form 1065

3,685,725

3,774,800

3,893,800

4,042,800

Form 1120S

4,566,216

4,587,500

4,669,400

4,727,400

Form 1120

1,080,099

1,217,200

1,308,900

1,319,300

DOUBLE TAX ON EARNINGS OF C CORPORATION DISTRIBUTED
AS DIVIDENDS TO SHAREHOLDERS

Although many existing "C" corporations have converted to S corporation status
(or other form of passthrough entity) and most new entities have been fonned as
some type of passthrough entity (S corporation, LLC or partnership), many
professional and other personal service corporations have remained C
corporations based on the assumption that they can successfully avoid the double
tax on eamings to which C corporations are generally subject by utilizing the
strategy of zeroing out their taxable income by payment of all or substantially all
of their eamings as deductible compensation to their shareholder-employees. It
has been widely accepted in the past by practitioners and taxpayers that the IRS
cannot successfully assert unreasonable compensation arguments against a
personal service corporation to recharacterize a portion of the compensation paid
to its shareholder-employees as dividend distributions. However, in light of the
application of the "independent investor test" by the Tax Court and the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals in Mulcahy, Pauritsch, Salvador & Co., 680 F.3d 867
(7th Cir. 2012)., and the Tax Court's prior decision in Pediatric Surgical
Associates, P.C. v. Comm 'r, TCM 2001-81, tax practitioners must recognize that
the IRS can make a successful argument to recharacterize the wages paid to the
shareholders-employees of a personal service corporation as dividends subject to
double taxation.
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C.

DOUBLE TAX ON SALE OF ASSETS OF C CORPORATION

Likewise, most entities have either converted from "C" status to "S" status or to
some other form of passthrough entity or been fonned as a passthrough entity to
avoid the double tax on the sale of assets to which "C" corporations are subject.
However, in order to avoid double taxation on the sale of a professional or other
service corporation's assets to a third party, tax practitioners have often sought to
avoid the double tax imposed upon C corporation's selling their assets by
allocation of a large portion of the purchase price to the "personal goodwill" of
the shareholders of the professional corporation. Although this strategy has
worked under certain circumstances, very recent cases have suggested that the
IRS can and will recharacterize so-called personal goodwill as corporate goodwill
subject to double taxation (or at the least to ordinary income tax rates rather than
capital gain tax rates) on the sale of the assets of a professional corporation.
II.

UNREASONABLY IDGH COMPENSATION AND C CORPORATIONS
A.

LAW

The relevant authority in this area is Section 162(a)(l), which allows a deduction
for ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during a taxable year in
carrying on a trade or business, including a "reasonable allowance" for salaries or
other compensation for personal services actually rendered.
Reg. § 1.162-7 (a) provides that the test of deductibility in the case of
compensation payments is whether such payments are reasonable and are, in fact,
payments purely for services. Consequently, there is a two-prong test for the
deductibility of compensation payments: (1) whether the amount of the payment
is reasonable in relation to the services performed, and (2) whether the payment
was, in fact, intended to be compensation for services rendered.
Reg. §1.162-7(b)(l) additionally provides that any amount paid in the form of
compensation, but not in fact as the purchase price of services, will not be
deductible. The regulation continues as follows: "An ostensible salary paid by a
corporation may be a distribution of a dividend on stock This is likely to occur in
the case of a corporation having few shareholders, practically all of whom draw
salaries. If in such a case the salaries are in excess of those ordinarily paid for
similar services and the excessive payments correspond or bear a close
relationship to the stockholdings of the officers or employees, it would seem
likely that the salaries are not paid wholly for services rendered, but that the
excessive payments are a distribution of earnings upon the stock"
Reg. §1.162-7(b)(2) provides that the fmm or method of fixing compensation will
not be decisive as to deductibility. The regulation continues that although any
form of contingent compensation invites scrutiny as a possible distribution of
earnings of the corporation, it does not necessarily follow that payments on a
contingent basis will be treated fundamentally on any basis different than that
applying to compensation at a flat rate.
2

Reg. § 1.162-7 (b )(3) provides that "the allowance for the compensation paid may
not exceed what is reasonable under all the circumstances. It is, in general, just to
assume that reasonable and true compensation is only such amount as would
ordinarily be paid for like services by like enterprises under like circumstances."
Reg. § 1.162-8 provides that in the case of excessive payments by corporations, if
such payments correspond or bear a close relationship to stockholders, and are
found to be a distribution of earnings or profits, the excessive payments will be
treated as a dividend.
Reg. § 1.162-9 provides that bonuses to employees will constitute allowable
deductions from gross income if such payments are made in good faith and as
additional compensation for the services actually rendered by the employees,
provided such payments, when added to salaries, do not exceed a reasonable
compensation for the services rendered.
As discussed above, the regulations set forth a two-prong test for the deductibility
of compensation payments: (1) whether the amount of payment is reasonable in
relation to the services performed, and (2) whether the payment was, in fact,
intended to be compensation for services rendered. Although a majority of the
cases focus on the reasonableness of the compensation paid, and do not focus
separately on the intent of the payment, several cases have discussed the intent
requirement.

B.

COMPENSATORY INTENT
In detetmining whether the payment was intended to be compensation for services
rendered, the courts have relied heavily on the initial characterization of the
payment by the corporation and have focused on such objective criteria as
whether the board of directors authorized the payment of the compensation in
question, whether employment taxes were withheld from the payment, whether a
Form W-2 was issued with regard to the payment in question, and whether the
payment was deducted on the accounting records or tax records of the corporation
as salary.
The leading case in this area is Paula Construction Co. v. Comm 'r, 58 TC 1055
(1972), aff'd per curiam, 474 F.2d 1345, 73-1 USTC ~9283 (5th Cir. 1973). In
Paula Construction, the shareholder-employees believed that the corporation's
Subchapter S status was in effect (it had been inadvertently and retroactively
terminated for the years in issue), and as such, did not reflect the corporation's
distributions as compensation in the corporate records or its tax returns as it
believed such distributions would be nontaxable distributions from the S
corporation to its shareholders. In holding that the corporation was not entitled to
a compensation deduction for the amounts paid, the Tax Court stated that "it is
now settled law that only if payment is made with the intent to compensate is it
deductible as compensation .... Whether such intent has been demonstrated as a
factual question is to be decided on the basis of the particular facts and
circumstances of the case." See also Electric & Neon v. Comm 'r, 56 TC 1324
3

(1971), aff'd per curiam, 496 F.2d 876, 74-2 USTC ~9542 (5th Cir. 1974), and
International Capital Holding Corp. v. Comm 'r, TCM 2002-109, in which the
Tax Court found that payments made to a management company were intended to
compensate the recipient for services rendered. Since the IRS conceded the
reasonableness of the amount paid, the payments were found to be deductible.
But see Neonatology Associates P.A., et al. v. Comm 'r, 2002 USTC ~50,550 (3rd
Cir. 2002), aff'g TCM 2001-270, where the Third Circuit affirmed the Tax Court
in three cases on VEBA deductions by medical corporations, holding that the
corporations could not deduct payments made to the VEBAs since the VEBAs
were not designed to provide benefits to employees, but were instead intended to
benefit the sponsoring owners of the VEBAs, and treating the payments as
constmctive dividends. These cases make it clear that it is absolutely necessary to
properly document payments made by a corporation to its shareholder-employees
as compensation (rather than as dividend distributions) in order for the payments
to be deductible. See also IRS Field Service Advice, 1994 W.L. 1725566
(addressing compensatory intent in the context of a law firm); IRS Field Service
Advice, 1995 W.L. 1918240; IRS Field Service Advice 200042001; GCM 36801
(1976); and Nor-Cal Adjusters v. Comm 'r, 74-2 USTC ~9701 (9th Cir. 1974).

C.

REASONABLENESS OF COMPENSATION AND THE MULTI-FACTOR
TEST
The leading case in the unreasonable compensation area is Mayson
Manufacturing Co. v. Comm 'r, 178 F.2d 115, 49-2 USTC ~9467 (6th Cir. 1949),
which sets forth nine factors to be used in evaluating the reasonableness of the
amount of an employee's compensation. These factors have generally been used
in one form or another in almost all subsequent cases analyzing the
reasonableness of compensation.
The nine factors set forth in the Mayson case are as follows:
1.

the employee's qualifications,

2.

the nature, extent, and scope of the employee's work,

3.

the size and complexities of the business,

4.

a comparison of the salaries paid with the gross income and the net
income of the business,

5.

the prevailing general economic conditions,

6.

a comparison of salaries with distributions to stockholders,

7.

the prevailing rates of compensation for comparable positions and
comparable businesses,

8.

the salary policy of the taxpayer for all employees,
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9.

the compensation paid to the pmiicular employee in prior years where the
business is a closely-held corporation.

Another significant case utilizing the multi-factor test is Elliotts Inc. v. Comm 'r,
716 F.2d 1241, 83-2 USTC 'lf9610 (9th Cir. 1983), rev'g TCM 1980-282. Elliotts
involved a corporation that sold and serviced equipment manufactured by John
Deere Company and other manufacturers. The taxpayer's sole shareholder,
Edward G. Elliotts, was found to have total managerial responsibility for the
taxpayer's business and was the ultimate decision and policy maker and, in
addition, performed the functions usually delegated to sales and credit managers.
He worked approximately 80 hours each week.
The taxpayer had compensated Elliotts by paying a base salary plus a year-end
bonus, which, since incorporation, had been fixed at 50% of net profits (before
deduction for taxes and management bonuses). On audit of the 1975 and 1976 tax
years, the IRS determined that a portion of the compensation paid to Elliotts was
unreasonable in amount.
After reviewing the testimony and statistical evidence presented by the parties, the
Tax Court concluded that the payments to Elliotts, in addition to providing
compensation for personal services, were intended in part to distribute profits and
were, therefore, nondeductible dividends.
The taxpayer appealed the Tax Court's dete1mination to the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit. The Ninth Circuit's opinion is important for three main
reasons. First, the Ninth Circuit recognized that in analyzing the two-prong test
for deductibility under Section 162(a)(1), a taxpayer's proof that the amount paid
is reasonable will often result in similar proof that the purpose for which the
payments are made is compensatory.
The second reason Elliotts is important is that the comi rejected any requirement
that a profitable corporation should use part of its earnings to pay dividends.
First, the court stated that no statute requires profitable corporations to pay
dividends. Second, any such requirement is based on the faulty premise that
shareholders of a profitable corporation will demand dividends. Third, it may
well be in the best interest of the corporation to retain and invest its earnings.
Although the first two issues outlined above are important, Elliotts is probably
more impmiant for categorizing the nine Mayson factors discussed above into the
following five categories:

1.

The employee's role in the company, including as relevant to such
consideration the position held, hours worked and duties performed by the
employee, in addition to the general importance of the employee to the
success of the company.

2.

An external comparison of the employee's salary with those paid by
similar companies for similar serv1ces. Thus, if a shareholder is
5

performing the work of three employees, for example, the relevant
comparison would be the combined salaries of those three employees in a
similar corporation.
3.

The character and condition of the company as indicated by its sales, net
income, and capital value, together with the complexities of the business,
as well as general economic conditions.

4.

Whether some relationship exists between the corporation and its
shareholder-employee which might pe1mit the company to disguise
nondeductible corporate distributions of income as salary expenditures
This category employs the
deductible under Section 162(a)(l).
independent investor standard, which provides that if the company's return
on equity remains at a level that would satisfy an independent investor,
there is a strong indication that management is providing compensable
services and that profits are not being siphoned out of the company as
disguised salary.

5.

A reasonable, long-standing, consistently applied compensation plan is
evidence that the compensation paid for the years in question is
reasonable.

In addition to the factors established by the courts, the IRS has developed its own
factors set forth in the Internal Revenue Manual, I.R.M. 4233, Part IV,
See also Martin and Harris,
Examination, at Section 4.3.1.5.2.5.2.2.
"Umeasonable Compensation: Pediatric Surgical Poses a Major New Threat for
PCs," 97 J. Tax'n 41 (July 2002). The favorable factors (indicative of a finding of
reasonable compensation) listed in prior versions of the Internal Revenue Manual
include the following:
1.

long hours,

2.

uniqueness of the employee's contribution,

3.

success in turning the company around,

4.

the company's above-average growth or profitability,

5.

experience level of the employee,

6.

high productivity and effectiveness of the employee,

7.

bonus arrangements entered into prior to becoming a stockholder,

8.

whether the employee was offered a higher salary by outsiders,

9.

inability of the employee to control compensation levels or dividends,

10.

salary compared favorably with that of employees of other companies,
6

11.

employee was undercompensated in previous years, and

12.

high retum on equity.

Unfavorable factors (indicative of a finding of unreasonable compensation) listed
in prior versions of the Intemal Revenue Manual) include the following:
1.

compensation rate exceeded that of comparable companies,

2.

lack of dividend payments,

3.

inappropriate compensation formulas,

4.

lack of unique employee skills,

5.

employee spent little time on the job or worked less than in previous years,

6.

the board of directors was not independent,

7.

salary increased without increase in duties, and

8.

bonus formulas changed because of high profits.

Following the Mayson and Elliots cases, numerous cases have applied the multifactor test in determining the reasonableness of compensation.
Klamath Medical Service Bureau v. Comm 'r, 29 TC 339 (1957), aff'd 261 F2d
842 (9th Cir 1958), cert denied 359 US 966, involved a corporation engaged in
the business of providing medical, surgical and hospital services under contract.
The stockholders were the doctors who performed these services. The court held
that the amount which equaled 100% of the doctors' billings represented
compensation for services rendered.
In Edwardo Catalano, Inc. v. Comm'r, TCM 1979-183, the Tax Court had to
determine whether the salary paid by a professional corporation to its sole
shareholder-employee was excessive.
Mr. Catalano was a well-known
professional architect and the sole shareholder and only employee of his
professional corporation. While the corporation paid Mr. Catalano large salaries
from 1969 through 1973 (the years in issue), the corporation still had taxable
income remaining after his salary was paid. In determining whether the salary
paid by the corporation was excessive, the comi looked at the Mayson factors and
found that since the company had adequate sources from which to pay Mr.
Catalano without threatening its own financial status, it could not support a
finding that such payment was unreasonable in amount.
Anthony LaMastro v. Comm'r, 72 TC 377 (1979), was an unusual case in that the
IRS had the burden to prove that compensation paid to the taxpayer was
unreasonable. Given that the IRS initially raised the issue in its amended
pleading, Rule 142(a) of the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure placed the
7

burden on the IRS. Despite the taxpayer's argument for reasonableness based on
the fact that his amount of work was comparable to that performed by him during
other periods, the court disagreed with the relevance of this contention. Instead,
the comi mled that the amounts contributed by taxpayer to his pension plan were
unreasonable as compensation and found in favor of the IRS.
~ 9576 (SD Ill
1980), the taxpayer was an Illinois automobile dealer whose sole stockholderemployee was responsible for all of the company's operations. The employee
received a small base salary, plus an incentive bonus based on 30% of the
corporation's earnings. The court mled that the amounts paid were reasonable,
because the facts revealed that the corporation's business volume and profits had
increased significantly under the stockholder's direction. A similar conclusion
was reached by the court in Automotive Investment Development, Inc. v. Comm 'r,
TCM 1993-298. The comi concluded that the sole shareholder's management and
leadership skills were primarily responsible for the corporation's significant
success. The court also recognized the shareholder's extensive experience in the
industry, extensive duties on the company's behalf, and the significant amount of
time devoted by him to the business.

In Lloyd Schumacher Chevrolet-Buick v. Comm 'r, 80-2 USTC

Similarly, in Mortex Manufacturing Company v. Comm'r, TCM 1994-110, the
court held that compensation paid to taxpayer's executive employees (excluding a
new employee who was still in training) was reasonable after taking into account
the history of the corporation's business and the services provided by each
employee. The court then noted that the taxpayer had been in excellent financial
condition since its incorporation and had maintained an excellent financial rating.
The court also noted that the total compensation paid by the corporation to its
shareholder-employees had averaged approximately 32% of net sales.
In L&B Pipe & Supply Company v. Comm'r, TCM 1994-187, the court applied

the Elliott's factors in its determination that compensation paid to the
corporation's two shareholder-employees was reasonable. This is another case in
a line of Tax Court decisions which involve a company's executives serving
multiple roles and functions in order to make its business successful. The court
attached a great deal of weight to the testimony of the taxpayer's expert witness
and found it entirely appropriate for the compensation paid to the shareholderemployees to reflect the combined salaries of the numerous job positions they
held, including the salaty payments due two co-presidents, a CFO, and the
managers of sales, credit, purchasing, and warehouse. 1
Thomas Curtis, MD., Inc. v. Comm'r, TCM 1994-15, involved a professional
corporation operating within a very specialized niche market: the preparation of
repmis used in place of medical testimony in worker's compensation cases. The
issue in the case involved the compensation paid to Ellen Curtis, the chief

1

See also Universal Manufacturing Co v. Comm 'r, TCM 1994-367; Lumber City Cmp v. Comm 'r, TCM 1996-171;
and PMT, Inc v. Comm 'r, TCM 1996-303.
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executive officer of the corporation. In its decision against the taxpayer, the Tax
Court noted the following:
•

The employee's role in the company is a very important factor. The court
recognized that Mrs. Curtis' "vision for expansion and ability to constantly
acquire and subsequently maintain attorney referrals have been of paramount
importance to the corporation's success." It was also noted that the
corporation's final medical report, which was the primary focus of Mrs.
Curtis' efforts, was "the corporation's most effective sales and marketing
tool."

•

The court analyzed significant data submitted by both parties concerning
comparable compensation and concluded that the data was not useful due to
the specialized nature of the corporation's business. The court stated "for the
evidence of comparable salaries to be awarded any weight, it must be shown
that such evidence is comparable .... " Furthermore, the court was "not
satisfied that a reasonable level of compensation for an executive like Mrs.
Curtis can be accurately determined by reference to the industries ...
surveyed because of the absence of significant infmmation on businesses
similar to petitioner's .... Furthermore, evidence of comparable salaries is not
as useful in the case of a professional service corporation . . . for which the
best evidence of the value of the services provided is the profit made .... "

•

The success of the business was considered an important factor. The fact that
the business was "one of the largest and more successful companies of its
kind" and was "unique among other psychiatric practices" supported the
compensation paid to Mrs. Curtis.

•

In determining whether the closely held nature of the corporation indicated
umeasonable compensation, the court considered whether the corporation's
return of equity would satisfy an independent investor, which was determined
by dividing net income by the corporation's equity.

C. T.I. Incorporated v. Comm 'r, TCM 1994-82, involved a corporation providing

highly specialized electrical engineering services.
The corporation paid
substantial compensation to its president, Edwardo Ca1daron. In allowing most of
the claimed compensation, the court determined that CTI's success depended on
the technical skills, background, and expertise of Mr. Caldaron, and stated that
Mr. Caldm·on was the primary, if not the sole, reason for CTI's success. In
reaching its decision, the court compared Mr. Caldaron to a professional athlete:
"His personal efforts, highly-specialized experience, and technical ability
petmitted CTI to receive these extraordinary revenues during the fiscal year under
consideration."

(

In Mad Auto Wrecking, Inc. v. Comm 'r,
reasonable all officers' compensation
involved a closely-held, high-volume,
wrecked automobiles and dismantled,
9

TCM 1995-153, the Tax Court allowed as
paid for the years in issue. Mad Auto
wholesale scrap business that purchased
sorted, and sold the automobile parts at

wholesale. The court found that the corporation operated virtually alone in its
indust1y due to the unique processes it perfmmed. In applying a Mayson-type
analysis, the court noted that the shareholder-employees were exceptionally well
qualified for the taxpayer's operations and were highly motivated individuals.
The court, consistent with the results of other cases, also found that the
shareholder-employees performed all of the taxpayer's executive and managerial
functions and perfmmed or supervised all of its manual labor. In holding for the
taxpayer, the court noted that the IRS's expert witness presented testimony on the
reasonableness of the shareholder-employee's compensation which was "not
based on data from businesses that are akin to the business at hand" and cited
Boca Construction, L&B Pipe & Supply Co., Thomas A. Curtis. MD., Lumber
City, PMI, Inc., among others. As the court's opinion makes evident, courts have
had a consistent problem with expert witnesses attempting to compare "apples to
oranges" in the context of determining the reasonableness of compensation when
unique businesses are involved.
In Boca Construction Inc. v. Comm 'r, TCM 1995-5, the court allowed a deduction
for all of the compensation paid to the company's two equal shareholders. The
shareholders were each paid $344,800 in 1989, and $408,750 each in 1990. The
comi considered twelve factors in making its decision and found that eight factors
favored the taxpayer, while four were inapplicable to the facts. The factors
considered by the court were:
1.

The employees' qualifications.

2.

The nature, extent, and scope of the employee's work. The court noted
that this factor involves the "general importance of the employee to the
success of the company .... "

3.

Size and complexity of the taxpayer's business.

4.

Comparison of salaries paid with gross and net income. Compensation
that was consistently around 30% of annual gross receipts was considered
reasonable. The reasonableness of the compensation was not an issue,
because company bonuses were tied to the business' profits/performance
or due to the fact that the bonuses were not formalized in the corporate
minutes. The court also stated: "Courts may give little or no weight to the
lack of corporate formality in closely held corporations."

5.

General economic conditions.

6.

Comparison of salaries with distributions to shareholders and retained
eammgs.

7.

Petitioner's salary policy as to all employees.

8.

Petitioner's financial condition.
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9.

Prevailing rates of compensation for comparable positions in comparable
companies. This factor was considered inapplicable due to the lack of
relevant information.

10.

Compensation paid in previous years.

11.

Whether the employee and employer deal at arm's length. The court
looked at whether an independent investor would approve of the
compensation paid to the employee.

12.

Whether the employee guaranteed the taxpayer's debt.

In its decision, the court considered factors (6), (7), (9) and (10) inapplicable to
the facts of the case.
In two cases decided at roughly the same time as Boca Construction, courts used
similar analyses in allowing all of the shareholder-employee's claimed
compensation. In Comtec Systems, Inc. v. Comm'r, TCM 1995-4, the court
allowed a deduction for the compensation paid to the corporation's sole
shareholder during 1988, which totaled $683,368. In Acme Construction Co., Inc.
v. Comm 'r, TCM 1995-6, the court allowed as a deduction all of the
compensation paid to the corporation's principal officer during 1990. The officer
was paid $442,150, consisting of an annual salary of $42,150, and a bonus of
$400,000. The compensation paid to the officer during 1990 represented a
significant increase compared to his compensation in prior years.
In Summit Sheet Metal Co. v. Comm 'r, TCM 1996-563, the court allowed salary
deductions for all of the compensation paid to three equal shareholders. The
comi's decision was based on the shareholders' qualifications and the scope of
their duties, the corporation's size, growth, and financial success, the employee's
compensation in relation to sales, and the fact that the business performed well
compared to other comparable firms. In comparing compensation to sales, the
court noted that prior judicial decisions have held that compensation equal to 43%
of gross profits was reasonable.

John L. Ginger Masonry, Inc. v. Comm'r, TCM 1997-251, is a significant case.
Even though the company in Ginger involved the construction industry, the case
has several important similarities to Thomas Curtis, which involved a professional
corporation. These similarities include the following:
•

Both cases involve a successful business in a specialized niche that was
almost entirely built up by the efforts of a single individual.

•

The individuals in each case performed multiple roles within their businesses,
including chief executive officer, chief administrative officer, marketing
executive, etc. Both businesses had a large number of jobs/cases in process
at one time, and both individuals had primary responsibility for a significant
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portion of the jobs/cases and supervised the balance. To do this, both
individuals devoted long hours each year to their businesses.
•

The compensation paid to each individual fluctuated significantly depending
on the success of the business on an annual basis. In the first year in question
in Ginger, Mr. Ginger's compensation increased by more than 100% to
$1,069,001. However, he was paid significantly less in the two subsequent
years covered by the case.

•

In both cases, no formal dividends were paid by the respective taxpayer.

•

The Tax Court allowed a deduction for all of the compensation paid to Mr.
Ginger. The court's decision was based on Mr. Ginger's "cmcial role" in the
business. The comi stated that he "served as the central figure in petitioner's
growth and success. Ginger effectively discharged the responsibilities of
several corporate executives." Although the court analyzed a survey of
financial data conceming compensation paid to others in Mr. Ginger's
industry, that information had little, if any, influence on the comi's final
decision. Additionally, the comi placed little significance on the closely held
nature of the business in stating that: "The mere existence of such a
relationship, coupled with an absence of dividend payments . . . does not
necessarily lead to the conclusion that the amount of compensation is
unreasonably high."

In Eberl's Claim Service, Inc. v. Comm 'r, 249 F3d 994 (1Oth Cir 2001 ), the Tenth
Circuit affirmed the Tax Comi's findings that cetiain shareholder salaries were
unreasonable. In reaching its decision, the court applied the Mayson factors to the
facts of the case and refused to adopt the independent investor approach taken by
Dexsil and Exacto. As a recent judicial interpretation of the reasonableness of
compensation in the context of the closely held corporation, the court's opinion
verifies that the traditional, multi-factor Mayson approach to testing
reasonableness is alive and well in cetiain circuits.

Reg. §1.162-7(b)(1) and §1.162-8 provide that it is likely that a compensation
payment is in fact a dividend distribution where excessive payments correspond
or bear a close relationship to the recipient's stock holdings in the company. The
"automatic dividend" mle set fotih in Charles McCandless Tile Service v. US.,
422 F.2d 1336, 70-1 USTC ~9284 (Ct. Cl. 1970), was rejected by the Elliotts case
discussed above as well as by the IRS in Rev. Rul. 79-8. 1979-1 CB 92. Although
there is no automatic dividend mle, the dividend history of the corporation and
whether the compensation (bonuses) is paid in proportion to the stock ownership
of the shareholder-employees are important factors in the multi-factor test. The
fact that compensation payments are not made in proportion to the shareholderemployee's stock ownership does not, however, preclude a finding that the
compensation payment actually constituted a dividend. See Kennedy v. Comm 'r,
671 F.2d 167, 82-1 USTC ~9186 (6th Cir. 1982), rev'g and remanding, 72 TC
793 (1979), and Mulcahy, Pauritsch, Salvador & Co., 680 F.3d 867 (7th Cir.
2012).
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D.

E.

REASONABLENESS OF COMPENSATION AND THE INDEPENDENT
INVESTOR TEST
1.

Background. The Independent Investor Test. In the Elliotts case, the five
factors used by the court in determining the reasonableness of
compensation paid by the corporation to its shareholder-employees
employed an independent investor standard. That standard provides that if
the corporation's return on equity remains at a level that would satisfy an
independent investor, there is a strong indication that management is
providing compensable services and that profits are not being siphoned out
of the company as disguised salary. This is refened to as the "independent
investor test."

2.

Dexsil Corp. In Dexsil Cmp. v. Comm 'r, 147 F.3d 96, 98-1 USTC
~50,471 (2nd Cir. 1998), the Second Circuit vacated and remanded a
decision of the Tax Court finding umeasonable employee compensation in
the context of a closely held corporation. In reaching its decision, the
court quoted its opinion in Rapco Inc. v. Comm 'r, 85 F.3d 950, 96-1
USTC ~50,297 (2nd Cir. 1996), in stating that "in this circuit the
independent investor test is not a separate autonomous factor; rather, it
provides a lens through which the entire analysis should be viewed," 147
F.3d at 101. The court thus articulated the notion that the independent
investor tests is more than a mere factor in determining the reasonableness
of compensation and provides the very basis for assessing reasonableness.

3.

Exacto Spring Corp. Other circuits have adopted the independent
investor test as set forth by the Second Circuit in Dexsil. In Exacto Spring
Corp. v. Comm 'r, 196 F.3d 833, 99-2 USTC ~50,964 (7th Cir. 1999), the
Seventh Circuit held that the salary paid to a shareholder-employee was
reasonable based on the fact that an independent investor would achieve a
high rate of return even with the shareholder's salmy. In following the
Dexsil court's reasoning, Chief Judge Posner stated that "[b]ecause judges
tend to downplay the element of judicial creativity in adapting law to fresh
insights and changed circumstances, the cases we have just cited [Dexsil
and Rapco] prefer to say ... that the 'independent investor' test is the 'lens'
through which they view the seven ... factors of the orthodox test. But that
is a fmmality. The new test dissolves the old and returns the inquiry to
basics."

RECENT CASES DETERMINING REASONABLE COMPENSATION
1.

The Menard Case. In Menard, Inc. v. Comm 'r, 560 F.3d 620 (7th Cir.
2009), the Seventh Circuit reversed the holding of the Tax Court and
found that the compensation paid by a corporation to its chief executive
officer constituted reasonable compensation rather than a non-deductible
dividend distribution to him.
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Menard, Inc. is a Wisconsin fum that under the name "Menard's" sells
hardware, building supplies and related products tlu·ough retail stores
scattered tlu·oughout the Midwest. In 1998, it was the third largest home
improvement chain in the United States, with only Home Depot and
Lowe's being larger. It was founded by John Menard in 1962, who
tlu·ough 1998 was the company's chief executive officer and
uncontradicted evidence shows him as working 12 to 16 hours a day six or
seven days a week and only taking seven days of vacation per year. Under
his management, Menard's revenues grew from $788,000,000 in 1991 to
$3,400,000,000 in 1998 and the company's taxable income grew from
$59,000,000 to $315,000,000 during the same time period.
The
company's rate of retum on shareholders' equity in 1998 was, according
to the IRS's expert, 18.8%, which was higher than the rate of retum on
shareholders' equity for either Home Depot or Lowe's.
Mr. Menard owned all of the voting shares in the company and 56% ofthe
non-voting shares, with the rest of the shares being owned by members of
his family. In 1998, his sala1y was $157,500, and he received a profitsharing bonus of $3,017,100 as well as a "5% bonus" that resulted in Mr.
Menard receiving an additional $17,467,800.
The 5% bonus program (5% of the company's net income before income
taxes) was adopted in 1973 by the company's Board of Directors at the
suggestion of the company's accounting firm. There was no suggestion
that any shareholder was disappointed that the company obtained a rate of
retum of only 18.8% or that the company's success in that year or any
other year had been due to windfall factors. In addition to finding that Mr.
Menard's compensation was excessive (primarily based on the
compensation paid to the chief executive officers of Home Depot and
Lowe's), the Tax Court found that such amounts were actually intended as
a dividend. The Tax Court reached this conclusion because Mr. Menard's
entitlement to his 5% bonus was conditioned on his agreeing to reimburse
the corporation if the deduction of the bonus from the corporation's
taxable income was disallowed by the IRS and because 5% of the
corporate eamings year-in and year-out looked more like a dividend than a
salary to the Tax Court. As will be discussed in more detail below, the
Seventh Circuit found that the Tax Court's holding was based on "flimsy
grounds."
In reviewing the Tax Court decision, the Seventh Circuit pointed out that a
corporation is not required to pay dividends. The main focus of the Tax
Court decision was whether Mr. Menard's compensation exceeded that of
comparable CEOs in 1998. Specifically, the CEO of Home Depot was
paid only $2,800,000 in 1998, and the CEO of Lowe's was paid a salary of
$6,100,000 in 1998 (both of which were considerably less than the total
compensation paid to Mr. Menard in 1998 of over $20,000,000).

14

The Seventh Circuit found that salary is just the beginning of a meaningful
comparison, because it is only one element of a compensation package.
Specifically, the Seventh Circuit pointed out that a risky compensation
structure implies that the executive's salary is likely to vary substantially
from year to year, and that Mr. Menard's compensation could have been
considerably less than $20,000,000 if the corporation did not have a good
year, a possibility the Tax Court completely ignored. Additionally, the
Seventh Circuit found that the Tax Court did not consider the severance
packages, retirement plans or other perks of the CEOs when it compared
Menard with the CEOs of Home Depot and Lowe's. The Seventh Circuit
also found that the Tax Court's opinion strangely remarked that because
Mr. Menard owned the company he had all the incentive he needed to
work hard without the need for a generous salary. The Seventh Circuit
pointed out that under the Tax Court's reasoning, reasonable
compensation for Mr. Menard might have been zero. In short, the Seventh
Circuit found that for compensation purposes, the shareholder-employee
should be treated like all other employees and that if an incentive bonus is
appropriate for a non-shareholder employee, there is no reason why a
shareholder-employee should not be allowed to participate in the same
manner. Based on these considerations and the fact that an independent
investor would be satisfied with an 18.8% rate of return, the Seventh
Circuit concluded that Mr. Menard's compensation was not excessive in
1998, and that the Tax Court committed clear enor in finding that Mr.
Menard's compensation was unreasonable.
2.

The Multi-Pak Corp. Case. In Multi-Pak Corp. v. Comm 'r, TCM 2010139, the Tax Court held that the compensation paid by the taxpayer's
wholly owned corporation for one of the years in issue (2002) was
reasonable, but recharacterized a portion of the compensation paid to the
taxpayer in the other year in issue (2003) as a non-deductible dividend
distribution because the amount of compensation paid to the taxpayer in
that year was unreasonable.

The taxpayer, Multi-Pak Corp., was a C corporation wholly owned by
Randall Unthank, who was the president, CEO and COO for the years in
issue. Mr. Unthank performed all of Multi-Pak's managerial duties and
made all personnel decisions, and was in charge of Multi-Pak's price
negotiations, product design, machine design and functionality, and
administration. Mr. Unthank also personally oversaw the expansion of
Multi-Pak's office and warehouse in order to accommodate Multi-Pak's
growing operations.
In 2002, Multi-Pak paid total compensation of $2,020,000 to Mr. Unthank,
consisting of a salary of $150,000 and a $1,870,000 bonus. In the other
year at issue, 2003, Multi-Pak paid a total compensation of $2,058,000 to
Mr. Unthank, consisting of a salary of $353,000 and a $1,705,000 bonus.
The IRS determined in a Notice of Deficiency that Multi-Pak could deduct
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only $665,000 and $660,000 of officer compensation for 2002 and 2003,
respectively, as reasonable compensation for Mr. Unthank's services
during those years. Additionally, the IRS imposed Section 6662(a)
accuracy-related penalties on Multi-Pak for the years in issue.
In reaching its decision, the court in Multi-Pak discussed and analyzed the
five categories previously set forth in the Elliotts case:

a.

The employee's role in the company, including as relevant to
such consideration the position held, hours worked and duties
peiformed by the employee, in addition to the general importance
of the employee to the success of the company. In Multi-Pak, the
Tax Court found that this factor favored the taxpayer based upon
Mr. Unthank's importance to Multi-Pale.

b.

An extemal comparison of the employee's sa/my with those paid
by similar companies for similar services. Thus, if a shareholder
is peJfonning the work of three employees, for example, the
relevant comparison would be the combined salaries of those
three employees in a similar corporation. After an extensive
analysis of the expert testimony presented by the taxpayer and the
IRS, the Tax Court in Multi-Pak found that the analysis performed
and the opinions expressed by both parties' experts were not
persuasive or reliable, and as such, found that the comparison to
the compensation paid by umelated firms was a neutral factor
which did not favor either party.

c.

The character and condition of the company as indicated by its
sales, net income, and capital value, together with the
complexities of the business, as well as general economic
conditions. The Tax Court found that although Multi-Pak's net
income in 2002 and 2003 was low when compared to revenues,
other factors such as equity, revenue, and gross profit pointed
towards a successful operation, and as such, found that this factor
favored the taxpayer.

d.

Whether some relationship exists between the corporation and its
shareholder-employee which might permit the company to
disguise nondeductible corporate distributions of income as
salary expenditures deductible under Section 162(a)(l). This
category employs the independent investor standard, which
provides that if the company's return on equity remains at a level
that would satisfy an independent investor, there is a strong
indication that management is providing compensable services and
that profits are not being siphoned out of the company as disguised
salary. As will be discussed in more detail below, the Tax Court
found that this factor favored the taxpayer in 2002 but favored the
IRS in 2003.
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e.

A reasonable, long-standing, consistently applied compensation
plan is evidence that the compensation paid for the years in
question is reasonable. The Tax Court found that in 2002 and
2003, Mr. Unthank paid himself a monthly bonus of $100,000 to
$250,000 in 19 of the 24 months, in four other instances, Mr.
Unthank paid himself a bonus of $50,000 or less, and in one other
instance paid himself a bonus of $375,000. Additionally, Mr.
Unthank's sons each were paid monthly bonuses that ranged from
zero to $90,000. Based on all these facts, the Tax Court concluded
that the taxpayer's payment of Mr. Unthank's bonuses was made
under a consistent business policy, and as such, this factor favored
the taxpayer.

In determining the rate of return which would be received by the
hypothetical independent investor, the Tax Court in Multi-Pak divided the
taxpayer's net profit (after payment of compensation and a provision for
income taxes) by the year-end shareholder's equity as reflected in its
financial statements. This yielded a return on equity of 2.9% for 2002 and
negative 15.8% for 2003. The court concluded that although an
independent investor may prefer to see a higher rate of return than the
2.9% in 2002, they believed that an independent investor would note that
Mr. Unthank was the sole reason for the company's significant rise in
sales in 2002 and would be satisfied with the 2.9% rate of return.
However, the court agreed with the IRS that a negative 15.8% return on
equity in 2003 called into question the level of Mr. Unthank's
compensation for that year. The court went on to state that when
compensation results in a negative return on shareholder's equity, it
cannot conclude, in the absence of a mitigating circumstance, that an
independent investor would be pleased. Consequently, the court felt that
if Mr. Unthank's salary was reduced to $1,284,104 in 2003, which would
result in a return on equity of 10% in 2003, that would be sufficient to
satisfy an independent investor. The court therefore held that taxpayer
was entitled to deduct the full $2,020,000 paid by it to Mr. Unthank in
2002 and was entitled to deduct $1,284,104 out of the original
compensation of $2,058,000 paid to Mr. Unthank in 2003.
Although the Tax Court did evaluate each of the five factors set forth in
the Elliotts case, it seemed to rely primarily on the independent investor
test in reaching its conclusions as to the reasonableness of the
compensation paid to Mr. Unthank in2002 and 2003.
Additionally, the court found that the taxpayer reasonably relied upon
professional advice so as to negate a Section 6662(a) accuracy-related
penalty because it met each of the following tests:
(1)

The advisor was a competent professional who had
sufficient expertise to justify reliance;
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3.

(2)

The taxpayer provided necessary and accurate infom1ation
to the advisor; and

(3)

The taxpayer actually relied in good faith on the advisor's
judgment.

(4)

Thus, the Tax Court declined to sustain the IRS's
determination as to the accuracy-related penalty.

The Mulcahy Case - Independent Investor Test Applied to
Professional Service Corporation. In Mulcahy, Pauritsch, Salvador &
Co., 680 F.3d 867 (7th Cir. 2012), the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
affirming the Tax Comi, held that over $850,000 paid in each of the three
years in issue to entities owned by each of the founding shareholders of an
accounting finn operated as a C corporation should be recharacterized as
nondeductible dividend distributions. The Mulcahy case represents the
first case in which a comi has applied the so-called "independent investor
test" in determining reasonable compensation in the professional service
corporation setting.

Under the facts of the case, an accounting firm operated as a C
corporation, had 40 employees located in multiple branches, and,
according to the comi, had both physical capital and intangible capital (in
the form of client lists and brand equity).
Although the corporation had revenues between $5 million to $7 million
annually, the corporation itself had little or no income because its gross
revenues were offset by deductions for business expenses, primarily
compensation paid directly or indirectly to its owner-employees, which
included three of the finn's accountants whose names form the name of
the finn and owned more than 80% of the firm's stock (the "Founding
Shareholders"). The firm reported taxable income of only $11,279 in
2001, a loss of $53,271 in 2002 and zero taxable income in 2003. In
addition to the salaries received by the Founding Shareholders that totaled
$323,076 in 2001, the corporation additionally paid more than $850,000 in
"consulting fees" for each of the three years in issue to three entities
owned by the Founding Shareholders, which in tum distributed the money
to the Founding Shareholders.
The IRS did not question the salary deductions, but disallowed the
consulting fees paid to the three entities owned by the Founding
Shareholders as nondeductible dividends, resulting in a deficiency in
corporate income tax of more than $300,000 for each of the three years in
ISSUe.

The Seventh Circuit found that the accounting firm would flunk the
independent-investor test if it were to treat the consulting fees as salary
expenses, since they reduced the firm's income such that the return to a
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hypothetical equity investor of the corporation would be zero or below
zero.
In its decision, the Seventh Circuit found that although the independent
investor test may not be applicable to the "typical small professional
services firm," the accounting finn in issue was not a very small fitm
because of its physical capital, numerous employees and intangible
capital. Consequently, as stated above, the Seventh Circuit found that the
Tax Court was correct to reject the fitm's argument that the consulting
fees were salary expenses because treating such expenses as salary
reduced the firm's income, and thus the retum to the hypothetical equity
investor, to zero or below zero. The Seventh Circuit specifically found
that there was no evidence that the "consulting fees" were compensation
for the Founding Shareholders' accounting and consulting services, but
rather were nondeductible dividend distributions.
The court specifically rejected the firm's argument that since the
consulting fees were allocated among the Founding Shareholders in
proportion to the number of hours that each of them worked, rather than
their stock ownership, those fees could not have been dividends. The
court stated that whatever the method of allocation of the fitm's income
(in accordance with stock ownership or othetwise), if the fees were paid
out of corporate income -- if every compensated hour included a capital
retum, the frrm owed corporate income tax on the net income hiding in
those fees and specifically stated that "a corporation cannot avoid tax by
using a cockeyed method of distributing profits to its owners." 2
The court went on to state that "remarkably, the firm's lawyers (an
accounting firm's lawyers) appear not to understand the difference
between compensation for services and compensation for capital .... " The
court also noted its puzzlement that the firm chose to organize as a
conventional business corporation in the first place, and scathingly
concluded by stating "That an accounting firm should so screw up its
taxes is the most remarkable feature of the case."
As demonstrated by the Mulcahy case, it is very difficult, if not
impossible, for most professional corporations to meet the independent
investor test where the professional corporation distributes all or
substantially all of its income in the form of compensation to its
shareholder-employees (in which case the retum for the independent
investor would be 0%). The Mulcahy case represents yet another tool in
the IRS's arsenal for attacking compensation paid to the shareholderemployees of a professional services corporation. In addition, the IRS has
the ability to attack compensation paid to the shareholders of a
2

See also, Kennedy v. Comm 'r, 671 F.2d 167 (6th Cir. 1982), rev'g and remanding, 72 TC 793 (1979), where the
court found that the fact that compensation payments are not made in proportion to the shareholder-employee's
stock ownership does not preclude a finding that the compensation payment actually constituted a dividend.
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professional services corporation based on the compensatory intent prong
of Reg. 1.162-7(a), as demonstrated by Richlands Medical Association,
TCM 1990-660, and Pediatric Surgical Associates, P.C. TCM 2001-81.
Based upon the rate changes made by the American Taxpayer Relief Act
of 2012, the highest marginal combined tax rate applicable to C
corporation eamings distributed as dividends will be 48%. Additionally,
note that such eamings are also subject to FICA (Social Security taxes),
including the new 3.8% Medicare tax imposed on higher eaming
taxpayers. By taking into account the additional 3.8% Medicare tax, the
maximum marginal rate on a "C" corporation's eamings distributed as
dividends to its shareholders will be 50.47%. 3
4.

Thousand Oaks Residential Care Home I, Inc. In Thousand Oaks
Residential Care Home L Inc. v. Comm 'r, TCM 2013-10, the Tax Court,
applying the five factor test set forth in the Elliotts case, as well as the
independent investor test, disallowed a large portion of the compensation
paid to the shareholders of a C corporation.
In Thousand Oaks, the taxpayers (Mr. and Mrs. Fletcher) owned and
operated an assisted living facility for a number of years prior to selling
the assisted living facility to a third party. Following the sale, the
taxpayers continued to be employed at the assisted living facility by the
new owner. For the years in issue, 2003, 2004 and 2005, the corporation
paid Mr. Fletcher W -2 wages of $200,000, $200,000, and $30,000,
respectively. Additionally, the corporation contributed $191,433 and
$259,506 to a pension plan for the benefit of Mr. Fletcher in 2003 and
2004, respectively, for a total compensation package of $880,939. The
corporation paid Mrs. Fletcher W-2 wages of $200,000, $200,000 and
$30,000, for 2003, 2004 and 2005, respectively. Additionally, the
corporation contributed $191,433 and $198,915 to a pension plan for the
benefit of Mrs. Fletcher in 2003 and 2004, respectively, for a total
compensation package of $820,348. The Board of Director minutes for
the years in issue stated that the compensation to the taxpayers was
approved for payment of back salaries that were not paid in prior years
due to insufficient cash flow.
The IRS contended that the compensation packages paid to the taxpayers
were not reasonable for the 2003, 2004 and 2005 tax years and disallowed
the deductions for all of the compensation. The taxpayers, on the other
hand, argued that the compensation paid in those years was reasonable and
included "catch-up" payments for prior years in which they were undercompensated.

3

See Looney and Levitt, "Operation of the Professional Corporation 2010: Reasonable Compensation Issues," for
Professional and Other Service Businesses, proceedings of the New York University 69th Institute on Federal
Taxation, May 2011.
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In its decision, the Tax Court did find that compensation for prior years
services is deductible in the current year so long as the employee was
actually undercompensated in prior years and the current payments are
intended for past services. Additionally, the Tax Court stated that when
the compensation was actually for prior years of service, it does not need
to be reasonable in the year it is actually paid.
The Tax Court then went through an analysis of the five broad factors set
fmih in the Elliotts case. The Tax Court also specifically stated that in the
Ninth Circuit, where an appeal in the taxpayers' case would lie, the
independent investor test must also be taken into account. After analyzing
the five factors set forth in the Elliotts case, the Tax Court then focused on
the independent investor test. Citing a number of cases, the Tax Comi
found that a return on investment of between 10% and 20% tends to
indicate compensation was reasonable. In particular, it stated that because
the corporation in issue was a small highly leveraged business purchased
with a large amount of debt, a hypothetical investor might be satisfied
with a 10% return on his investment. Consequently, the Tax Court, taking
into account a 10% rate of return, backed into the reasonable
compensation to which the taxpayers were entitled, and disallowed a total
of $282,615 of compensation paid to them. This should be contrasted with
the Aries case discussed above which also found a return of 10%-20%
reasonable, but still found a portion of the compensation in that case to be
unreasonable based on the application of the multi-factor test.
5.

K&K Veterinary Supply. In K&K Veterinary Supply v. Comm 'r, TCM
2013-84, the Tax Comi, siding with the IRS's expert, recharacterized a
pmiion of the salaries paid to the sole shareholder of a C corporation and
to other members of his family, as well as rental payments made by the
Corporation to another entity wholly owned by the shareholder, as nondeductible dividends.

The C corporation was a wholesale distributor of animal health products
for large animals, swine, sheep, goats and horses; lawn and garden
products; farm hardware; pet supplies; and products for farm stores and
related dealers. The corporation was wholly owned by Jay Lipsmeyer,
who served as president, co-chief executive officer and co-chief operating
officer of the corporation. His wife, Melissa Lipsmeyer, served as vice
president, secretary, and assistant chief financial officer of the corporation,
while his brother, David Lipsmeyer, served as the corporation's senior
vice president of sales and co-chief executive and co-chief operating
officer). Jay Lipsmeyer's daughter, Jennifer Stewart, served as the
corporation's chief financial officer.

(
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In a departure from some recent opinions applying the so-called

"independent investor" test, 4 the comi, in determining reasonable
compensation, applied the so-called multi-factor test to determine
reasonable compensation for the officers of the corporation, rather than the
so-called "independent investor" test. Citing Charles Snyder & Co. v.
Comm 'r, 500 F2d 48 (8th Cir. 1974), aff'g TCM 1973-130, the court
stated that various factors should be considered in determining the
(1) the employee's
reasonableness of compensation, such as:
qualifications, (2) the nature, extent and scope of the employee's work, (3)
the size and complexity of the business, (4) prevailing general economic
conditions, (5) the employee's compensation as a percentage of gross and
net income, (6) the employee-shareholder's compensation compared with
distributions to shareholders, (7) the employee-shareholder's
compensation compared with that paid to non-shareholder employees, (8)
prevailing rates of compensation for comparable positions in comparable
concerns, and (9) comparison of compensation paid to a particular
shareholder-employee in previous years where the corporation has a
limited number of officers. The comi additionally stated that special
scrutiny must be given to situations where a corporation is controlled by
the employees to whom the compensation is paid because there is a lack of
arms-length bargaining.
In reaching its decision, the Tax Court evaluated all of these factors, and

looked primarily to the testimony given by the expert witnesses. After
considering the repmis of the taxpayer's expert and the IRS's expert, the
court found the IRS expeti's report persuasive and accepted his
conclusions as to reasonable compensation for each of the officers for the
years in issue, 2006 and 2007, which resulted in the balance of the
compensation being treated as non-deductible dividend distributions to the
sole shareholder.
The court then considered the deductibility of the rental payment made by
the corporation to the related entity owned by the sole shareholder of the
corporation. The court stated that in detetmining whether the payments in
issue were rental payments deductible under Section 162(a)(3), the "basic
question is . . . whether they were in fact rent rather than something else
paid under the guise of rent." 5 Again, the taxpayer had his own expert as
to whether the rental payments were reasonable and the IRS had its own
expert testify as to whether the rental payments were reasonable. Once
again, the court accepted the position taken by the IRS's expert as to
reasonable rent, and treated the balance of the rental payments as nondeductible dividends to the sole shareholder of the corporation.

4

See, e.g., Menard Inc. v. Comm'r, 560 F.3d 620 (7th Cir. 2009); Multi-Pak Cmp. v. Comm'r, TCM 2010-139;
Mulcahy, Pauritsch, Salvador & Co. v. Comm 'r, 680 F.3d 867 (7th Cir. 2012); and Thousand Oaks Residential Care
Home I, Inc. v. Comm 'r, TCM 2013-10.
5
Place v. Comm 'r, TC 199 (1951), aff'd per curium 199 F2d 373 (6th Cir. 1952).
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6.

Aries Communication, Inc. In Aries Communication, Inc. v. Comm 'r,
TCM 2013-97, the Tax Court held that the compensation paid to a
communications corporation's sole shareholder was unreasonable and
upheld an accuracy-related penalty. The tax year at issue is the fiscal year
ending August 31, 2004.
The case involved compensation paid to N. Atihur Astor (Astor), the
president, CEO, CFO, and sole shareholder of Aries Communications Inc.
in his capacity as general manager of a number of radio stations owned by
At·ies and its subsidiaries, Orange Broadcasting Corp. and North County
Broadcasting (collectively, At·ies).
Astor had worked in radio
broadcasting in various capacities for 60 years. As the key employee and
hands-on owner-operator, Astor made decisions regarding personnel,
programming, sales, and acquiring and maintaining FCC licenses, and he
negotiated directly with lenders and outside advisors.
Astor's personal services also included negotiating purchases and sales of
individual radio stations, resulting in prices far exceeding the buyers'
original offers (e.g., increased to $18 million from $12 million). Astor
personally guaranteed a $20 million loan for Aries, which precipitated the
sales of two radio stations as part of a forbearance agreement with the
lender. There were a number of interparty loans between Astor and At·ies.
Between the years 1992 and 2002, Aries was losing increasing amounts of
money. It sold a radio station in each of the years 2003 and 2004 and was
profitable in those years; however, Aries began losing money again in the
succeeding years.
For the year at issue, fiscal year 2004, the IRS disallowed $6,086,752 of
Aries' claimed Section 162 deduction for compensation paid to Astor, and
detetmined a deficiency of $2,676,002 and a Section 6662(a) accuracyrelated penalty of $535,200.40. Aries petitioned the Tax Comi and argued
in pati that the amount paid to Astor in fiscal year 2004 included catch-up
amounts for the three prior years; thus, the comi evaluated the
reasonableness of Astor's compensation for FY 2001 through FY 2004.
The comi determined that there is no doubt that Astor was the most
valuable employee of At·ies, and that at least a portion of the compensation
paid to him was for services actually rendered.
To determine whether the compensation was reasonable, the court applied
the five factors enunciated by the court in Elliotts:
1.

The employee's role in the company.

2.

A comparison of the employee's salary with salaries paid by
similar companies for similar services.
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3.

The character and condition of the company.

4.

Potential conflicts of interest.

5.

Intemal consistency.

The court also applied an additional factor: Whether an independent
investor would be willing to compensate the employee as the taxpayer
compensated the employee, based on all the facts and circumstances.
With respect to the first factor (the employee's role in the company), the
court determined that Astor was a hands-on owner-operator actively
involved in managing many aspects of Aries' day-to-day operations. His
business acumen and experience resulted in successful investments for
Aries, including acquisition of FCC licenses and the successful sales of
two radio stations. The first factor thus weighed in favor of Aries.
For the second factor (comparison with similar companies' salaries), the
parties provided experts with divergent opinions regarding reasonable
compensation. Aries provided two experts and the IRS provided one
expert, each of which used linear regression as a tool to compare industry
income and compensation. The experts agreed that extemal comparisons
were difficult because Aries was one of the few companies in the industry
in which the owner was also the operator, and that Astor was underpaid
during the four years evaluated by the court. The experts also agreed that
Astor's salary was underpaid in previous years, and the court averaged
their conclusions.
However, the expe1is disagreed regarding the
reasonableness of the $6,697,700 bonus paid to Astor during the year at
issue. The court, using its judgment and based on the evidence in the
record, dete1mined that an appropriate bonus would be $2 million. This
factor weighed against Aries.
For the third factor (character and condition of the company), the court
found that Aries was a large asset-laden complex business holding
multiple subsidiaries, each with its own radio station. The court noted that
Aries lost money in all years except the years it sold radio stations, that it
was deeply in debt, and that it had to borrow money from Astor even
during the year it paid him the bonus at issue. The comi concluded that
this bleak financial situation suggested that Aries was thinly capitalized,
and cast a shadow on the substance of the transaction. This factor also
weighed against Alies.
The fourth factor (potential conflicts of interest) concems whether a
relationship exists between the employee and the company that may
pe1mit the disguise of nondeductible corporate distributions as salary
expenditures. Noting a lack of specific evidence in the record regarding
whether Aries had ever paid dividends to Astor, the comi determined that
such a relationship did exist. Also, the various related-party loans and
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Astor's personal guarantee of the $20 million debt made it difficult to
discem the true capital structure and equity status of the corporate entities.
Further, although Astor negotiated the highest price for the sale of the
radio station, just as an independent investor would, he had significant
interest in receiving the reward as deductible salary instead of a
nondeductible dividend. This factor again weighed against Aries.
The court found the fifth factor (intemal consistency) to be neutral. The
court found the amount of Astor's bonus to be "suspect" because it was
not paid under a structured formal plan and was determined the end of the
year when Aries' profits and potential income tax liabilities could be
predicted. However, no employees within the corporation had comparable
duties, and the compensation included amounts for prior years of hard
work for which he was undercompensated.
Finally, with respect to the additional factor (the independent investor), the
court considered what a reasonable retum on investment for a hypothetical
independent shareholder would be. Citing case law, the court determined
that a retum on investment of 10%-20% tends to indicate compensation is
reasonable. Aries was a highly leveraged business but possessed assets,
such as the FCC licenses, that were likely to appreciate. Further, it was
unclear from the record what Astor's initial investment was and the
interparty loans made it difficult to determine the retum on investment.
Nevertheless, the court's review of Aries' net income after paying
compensation revealed that retained eamings would have been almost
enough to satisfy an independent investor at 20%. This factor weighed in
favor of Aries.
Based on all the facts and circumstances, the court concluded that Astor's
compensation was unreasonable for the year at issue, and not deductible to
Aries in its entirety. The court computed an amount that was deductible,
based on the average underpaid salaries for previous years plus the actual
fixed salaty, and a $2 million bonus that was determined reasonable for
the year at issue. Regarding the Section 6662(a) accuracy-related penalty,
the court noted that Aries did not provide any evidence of reasonable
cause; accordingly, the penalty was upheld.
If this case had been decided exclusively under the independent investor
test discussed below, which many courts have more recently favored, it
would appear that a different result would have been reached in Aries and
all of the compensation would have been treated as reasonable
compensation.
7.

6
7

Independent Investor Test Being Used More Frequently. Based upon
a number of these recent cases, including the Menard, 6 Multi-Pak./

560 F3d 620 (7th Cir 2009).
TCM 2010-139.

25

Mulcahy, Pauritsch, Salvador & Co. 8 and Thousand Oaks 9 cases, the
comis seem to be putting more emphasis on the independent investor test
(than the multi-factor test) in determining the reasonableness of
compensation.

III.

EMPLOYMENT TAX ISSUES
A.

THE SELF -EMPLOYMENT TAX
For 2014, the self-employment tax ("SE Tax") can be a significant burden on
taxpayers as it is imposed on net eamings from self-employment ("NESE") at the
rate of 15.3% on the first $117,000 of such net eamings, and 2.9% on amounts in
excess of $117,000. (Section 1402(a)). Excluded from the definition of NESE
are certain capital gains, rental income, interest and dividends. Because
individuals are entitled to an above the line deduction equal to one-half of the SE
Tax paid under Section 164(f), the effective tax rate for the SE Tax is somewhat
reduced. Among the factors to be considered in choosing the form of business
entity that will be used to operate a closely-held business is the applicability of the
SE tax on an owner's share of income from the business entity.

B.

HEALTH CARE AND EDUCATION RECONCILIATION ACT OF 2010
The Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of2010, H.R. 4872, P.L. 111152, imposes a new tax on uneamed income on partners, members ofLLCs taxed
as partnerships and S corporation shareholders. Specifically, Section 1411(a)(1)
imposes a 3.8% tax on the lesser of (a) "net investment income" or (b) the excess
of modified adjusted gross income over $250,000 in the case of taxpayers filing a
joint retum and over $200,000 for other taxpayers. Under Section 1411(c)(A)(i),
"net investment income" includes gross income from interest, dividends,
annuities, royalties, and rents other than such income which is derived in the
ordinary course of a trade or business. Consequently, items of interest, dividends,
annuities, royalties, and rents which pass through a partnership, LLC or S
corporation to its partners, members or shareholders, will retain their character as
net investment income and will be subject to the new 3.8% net investment income
tax.
Additionally, the term "net investment income" includes: (1) any other gross
income derived from a trade or business if such trade or business is a passive
activity within the meaning of Section 469, with respect to the taxpayer; and (2)
any net gain (to the extent taken into account in computing taxable income)
attributable to the disposition of propetiy other than property held in a trade or
business that is not a passive activity under Section 469 with respect to the
taxpayer.

8
9

680 F3d 867 (7th Cir 2012).
TCM 2013-10.
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Consequently, a patiner, including a limited partner, LLC member and an S
corporation shareholder, will be subject to the new 3.8% net investment income
tax on his or her distributive share of the operating income of the partnership,
LLC or S corporation, as the case may be, if the activity generating such income
is passive under Section 469 with respect to such partner, LLC member or S
corporation shareholder.
The Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 also increased the
Medicare portion of the FICA tax by .9% (to 3.8%) on wages in excess of
$250,000 in the case of taxpayers filing a joint retum and more than $200,000 for
other taxpayers, as well as the Medicare pmiion of the self-employment tax by
.9% (to 3.8%) on eamings from self-employment in excess of $250,000 in the
case of taxpayers filing a joint retum and more than $200,000 for other taxpayers.
The new 3.8% tax provisions are effective for tax years beginning after January
31,2012.
C.

SOLE PROPRIETORSHIPS
Clearly, individuals eaming income as sole proprietors (either as a sole
proprietorship or a single member LLC which is treated as a disregarded entity
under the Check-the-Box Regulations) from a trade or business are generally
required to treat such ordinaty income from that trade or business as NESE.

D.

PARTNERSHIPS
The SE Tax treatment of general patiners is generally understood: each general
partner must include as NESE his distributive share of ordinary income (other
than the excluded interest, rent and dividends). Section 1402(a)(13) excludes
from NESE a limited patiner's distributive share of partnership income (other
than distributions that are guaranteed payments or compensation for services to
the extent that those payments are established to be in the nature of remuneration
for those services to the partnership).
Accordingly, a general partner's
distributive share of income from the partnership normally will be treated as
NESE, while a limited partner's distributive share of income from the partnership
normally will not be treated as NESE. The legislative history of Section 1402
makes clear that this exception for limited partners was intended to prevent
passive investors, who do not perform services, from obtaining social security
coverage or coverage under qualified retirement plans. One troubling issue
relates to the application of the SE Tax with respect to a limited partner who also
serves as a general partner in a partnership. Section 1402's legislative history
reflects an intent to apply these rules separately to limited partnership and general
partnership interests, even if held by the same partner. The lack of legislative or
regulatory clarity has caused the application of rules for limited patiners to be
difficult.
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E.

LLCs TAXED AS PARTNERSIDPS
While multi-member LLCs (which do not elect to be treated as associations
taxable as corporations) are treated as patinerships for tax purposes under the
Check-the-Box Regulations, the SE Tax issues relating to LLCs and their
members are at best unclear. The question to be addressed is whether members of
such LLCs (taxed as partnerships) would be treated as limited partners under
Section 1402(a)(l3), so that their distributive share of LLC income and loss
relating to their LLC interest is exempt from SE Tax.
On its face, the language of Section 1402(a)(l3) would only exclude from NESE
the distributive share of income of a limited partner of a partnership. Under such
a literal reading, the distributive share of income of any other type or class of
partner in the patinership would be considered NESE. Rev. Rul. 58-166, 1958-1
C.B. 224, held that the taxpayer's earnings from a worldng interest in an oil lease
was NESE despite the fact that he had limited involvement in the organization.
2.

The 1994 Proposed Regulations. With the advent of LLC statutes in the
early 1990's and thereafter, the IRS attempted to address theSE Tax issue
with respect to members of LLCs through the promulgation of Prop. Reg.
§1.1402(a)-18 (the "1994 Regulations"). Under the 1994 Regulations, a
member of a member-managed LLC would have been treated as a limited
patiner for purposes of Section 1402(a)(l3) if: (i) the member was not a
manager of the LLC; (ii) the LLC could have been formed as a limited
partnership (rather than as an LLC in the same jurisdiction); and (iii) the
member could have qualified as a limited partner in that limited
patinership under applicable law.
Accordingly, for manager-managed LLCs, whether a non-manager
member's share of the LLC' s income would be considered NESE turned
on whether such member's interest could have been characterized as a
limited partnership interest had the LLC been formed as a limited
partnership. This factual determination often proved to be unworkable
and depended on several factors, including the amount of the member's
participation in the LLC 's business operations and the provisions of the
LLC Act and Limited Partnership Act of the applicable state.

3.

The 1997 Proposed Regulations. The next attempt by the IRS to address
the application of the SE Tax to members of an LLC were the 1997
proposed regulations. Prop. Reg. §1.1402-2(h) defines a "limited partner"
for purposes of the SE Tax as an individual holding an interest in an entity
classified as a federal tax partnership unless one of the following
exceptions applies:
a.

The individual has personal liability for the debt of or claims
against the partnership by reason of being a partner. For this
purpose, an individual has personal liability if the creditor of the
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entity may seek satisfaction of all or any portion of the debts or
claims against the entity from such individual.
b.

The individual has authority under the law of the jurisdiction in
which the partnership is formed to contract on behalf of the
partnership.

c.

The individual pmiicipates in the partnership's trade or business
for more than 500 hours during the partnership's tax year.

Additionally, there are three exceptions to the general rule set forth in
Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1402-2(h), as follows:
(1)

Under the first exception, an individual who holds more
than one class of interest in a partnership and who is not a
limited partner under the general definition, may still be
treated as a limited partner with respect to a specific class
of interest. This exception is satisfied if immediately after
the individual acquires the class of interest: (1) persons
who are limited partners under the general definition own a
substantial continuing interest in the class of interest; and
(2) the individual's rights and obligations with respect to
that class of interest are identical to the rights and
obligations of the specific class held by the partners of that
class who satisfy the general definition of a limited partner.
Whether the interests of the limited partners in the specific
class under the general definition are substantial is
determined based on all of the relevant facts and
circumstances. There is a safe harbor under which 20% or
greater ownership of the specific class is considered
substantial. The proposed regulations define class of
interest as an interest that grants the holder specific rights
and obligations. A separate class exists if the holder's
rights and obligations attributable to an interest are
different from another holder's rights and obligations. The
existence of a guaranteed payment to an individual for
services rendered to the partnership is not a factor in
detetmining the rights and obligations of a class of interest.

(2)

The second exception applies to an individual who holds
only one class of interest. Under this exception, an
individual who cannot meet the general definition of
limited partner because he or she participates in the partnership's trade or business for more than 500 hours during the
pminership's tax year is treated as a limited pminer if: (1)
persons who are limited partners under the general
definition own a substantial continuing interest in the class
of interest; and (2) an individual's rights and obligations
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with respect to that class of interest are identical to the
rights and obligations of that specific class held by persons
who satisfy the general definition of a limited partner.
(3)

4.

The third exception applies to a service partner in a service
partnership and provides that regardless of whether the
individual can satisfy the general definition of a limited
patiner under one of the above-described exceptions, that
individual may not be treated as a limited partner. A
partnership is a service partnership if substantially all of its
activities involve the performance of services in the fields
of health, law, engineering, architecture, accounting,
actuarial science, or consulting. A service partner is a
partner who provides services to or on behalf of the service
partnership's trade or business unless that individual's
services are de minimis.

The Moratorium. Immediately following the issuance of the 1997
regulations, significant protests were made. As a result of this significant
protest, Congress enacted Section 935 of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997,
Pub. L. No. 105-34, which prohibited the issuance or effectiveness of
temporary or final regulations with respect to the definition of a limited
partner under Section 1402(a)(l3) prior to July 1998. Although the
moratorium period has long since passed, no guidance on the definition of
a limited partner for self-employment tax purposes under Section
1402(a)(l3) has been issued to date.
Accordingly, as a result of the moratorium, there is a dearth of authority
with respect to the SE Tax treatment of an LLC member's distributive
share of an LLC's income. The only available guidance in existence are
several private letter rulings that hold that a member is a patiner and that a
member's distributive share of partnership income is not excepted from
NESE by Section 1402(a )(13). 10
While the Congress and the Treasury seem to have reached a deadlock on
the self-employment tax issue involving partnerships, the American Bar
Association Taxation Section and the AICPA Tax Division developed a
legislative proposal to treat members of LLCs that are taxed as
partnerships in the same manner as partners of palinerships generally.
Simply put, under this proposal, income attributable to capital would be
excluded from NESE and income attributable to services would be
included. The effect of the proposal is to adopt two safe harbors for
determining income attributable to capital, one on an interest-base retum
of capital, the other on an exclusion for amounts in excess of reasonable

10

See Ltr. Ruls. 9432018, 9452024 and 9525058.
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compensation for services rendered. This legislative proposal was
submitted to Congressman Bill Archer by Paul Sachs on July 6, 1999. 11
Interestingly, on June 10, 2003, Lucy Clark, a national tax issue specialist
in the IRS's examination specialization program, stated that taxpayers may
rely on the 1997 regulations. Specifically, she said that "if the taxpayer
conforms to the latest set of proposed rules, we generally will not
challenge what they do or don't do with regard to self-employment
taxes." 12
5.

The Thompson Case. In Thompson v. US., 87 F. Cl. 728 (2009), the
United States Court of Federal Claims held that an LLC member could
not be treated the same as a limited partner for purposes of meeting the
material participation rules under the passive activity loss limitation rules
of Section 469.
The taxpayer-member formed Mountain Air Charter, LLC ("Mountain
Air") under the laws of the state of Texas. The taxpayer directly owned a
99% membership interest in Mountain Air and indirectly held the
remaining 1% through an S corporation. Mountain Air's Articles of
Organization designate the taxpayer-member as its only manager.
Because Mountain Air did not elect to be treated as a corporation for
federal income tax purposes, by default it was taxed as a partnership. 13 On
his 2002 and 2003 individual income tax returns, the taxpayer-member
claimed Mountain Air's losses of $1,225,869 and $939,870, respectively.
The IRS disallowed the losses because it believed that the taxpayer did not
materially participate in the business operations of Mountain Air.
Specifically, the IRS rested its conclusion on Reg. § 1.469-ST, which sets
forth the tests for what constitutes taxpayer material patiicipation for
purposes of applying the passive activity loss limitation rules of Section
469. The IRS found that Reg. § 1.469-ST "explicitly treats interests in any
entity which limits liability as limited partnership interests." Because the
taxpayer enjoyed limited liability as a member of his limited liability
company (Mountain Air), the IRS concluded that the taxpayer's interest
was identical to a limited partnership interest. The taxpayer, on the other
hand, argued that his membership interest should not be treated as a
limited partnership interest for purposes of the passive activity loss
limitation rules. The classification of a membership interest in an LLC as
a "limited partnership interest" is important because a limited patiner has
fewer means by which he can demonstrate his material participation in the
business. The parties specifically stipulated that if the taxpayer's
membership interest is a limited partnership interest, then the taxpayer
cannot demonstrate his material participation in the LLC and Section 469

11

See Tax Notes, July 19, 1999, at 469.
BNA's Daily Tax Report (Friday June 13, 2003), G-3.
13
Reg. §301.7701-3(b)(1)(i).

12
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will limit his losses. Likewise, the parties also stipulated that if the
taxpayer's membership interest is not a limited partnership interest, then
the taxpayer can demonstrate his material participation in the LLC and
Section 469 does not limit his losses.
The taxpayer simply argued that his interest should not be treated as a
limited partnership interest because Mountain Air was not a limited
partnership. The IRS, on the other hand, argued that it was proper to treat
the taxpayer's interest in Mountain Air as a limited partnership interest
because the taxpayer elected to have Mountain Air taxed as a partnership
for federal income tax purposes and the taxpayer's liability was limited
under the laws of the state in which it was organized (Texas).
Based on the plain language of both the statute and the regulations, the
court concluded that in order for an interest to be classified as a limited
partnership interest the ownership interest must be in an entity that is, in
fact, a partnership under state law and not merely taxed as such under the
Code. Specifically, the court stated that once Reg. § 1.469-ST(e)(3) is read
in context and with due regard to its text, stmcture, and purpose, it
becomes abundantly clear that it is simply inapplicable to a membership
interest in an LLC.
Furthermore, the court found that even if Reg. § 1.469-5T(e)(3) could
apply to the taxpayer and the court had to categorize his membership
interest as either a limited or general partnership interest, it would best be
categorized as a general partner's interest under Reg. § 1.469-5T(e)(3 )(ii)
since a member in an LLC can actively participate in the management of
the LLC (unlike limited partners of a limited partnership).
6.

IRS Action on Decision. In Action on Decision2010-14, IRB 515 (April
5, 2010), the IRS announced its acquiescence in result only in Thompson.
In addition to Thompson, Garnett v. Comm 'r, 132 TC 19 (2009), Gregg v.
US., 186 F.Supp.2d 1123 (D. Or. 2000), and Newell v. Comm 'r, TCM
2010-23, have allmled against the IRS's position that an interest in an
LLC is a limited partnership interest under Reg. § 1.469-5T(e)(3)(i).

According to Diana Miosi, special counsel in the IRS Office of Associate
Chief Counsel (Passthroughs and Special Industries), the AOD was issued
"to get the word out that we're not going to be litigating these cases
anymore." Ms. Miosi's remarks were made on March 10, 2010 at a BNA
Tax Management luncheon. Additionally, Miosi stated that the string of
litigation losses has "gotten our attention," and that "it is important to tty
to get some guidance out in this area." Finally, Miosi noted that the
govermnent has stmggled with the issue, not only with respect to Section
469, but also in other areas of the Code as well, such as Sections 464 and
736, and the self-employment tax area.
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The distinction between membership interests in limited liability
companies and limited partnership interests in limited pminerships will be
of even greater significance because the new net investment income tax
imposed on a partner's distributive share of the operating income of a
partnership if the activity of the partnership producing the income is
passive with respect to the partner under the passive activity loss
limitation rules of Section 469.
7.

Implication of Thompson Case on Self-Employment Tax to LLC
Members. The issue of whether the members of a multi-member LLC
which is taxed as a pa1inership for federal income tax purposes are treated
as general partners or limited partners for purposes of the self-employment
tax is unclear at best. Obviously, the IRS could use the same reasoning
used against the IRS in the Thompson, Garnett, Newell and Gregg cases to
reach the conclusion that a member's interest in the LLC is not equivalent
to a limited pminer's interest in a limited partnership for purposes of selfemployment tax. This would result in members of an LLC being subject
to the self-employment tax on their distributive share of the income of an
LLC (with certain exceptions for interest, dividends, rent and capital gain).
However, on January 14, 2010, Diana Miosi reassured practitioners that
they may rely on the proposed 1997 regulations in dealing with the
application of the self-employment tax to limited liability companies. See
TNT, Jan. 15, 2010.

8.

The Robucci Case. In Robucci v. Comm 'r, TCM 2011-19, the Tax Comi
applied the two-pronged Moline Properties (Moline Properties v. Comm 'r,
319 U.S. 436, 30 AFTR 1291 (1943)) test to disregard two corporations
created by a psychiatrist (on the advice of his attorney/ accountant) for the
purpose of reducing his tax liabilities. The court also imposed an
accuracy-related penalty under Section 6662(a) for a substantial
understatement of income tax.
The taxpayer met with his advisor to explore the benefits of incorporating
his practice, including minimizing taxes. The taxpayer's advisor, who was
an attorney and certified public accountant (CPA), had an accounting
practice that specialized in small businesses. "Choice of entity planning"
for those businesses was a significant pmi of the advisor's practice.

f

The taxpayer's advisor recommended an organizational structure designed
to transfmm the taxpayer's sole proprietorship into a limited liability
company (LLC) classified as a partnership for federal income tax purposes
with the intent of reducing self-employment tax. In particular, the LLC
would have two members: the taxpayer, who would have a 95% interest,
and a newly incorporated personal corporation ("Robucci P.C."), which
was designated the manager of the LLC with a 5% interest. The
taxpayer's 95% interest was split between an 85% interest as a limited
partner and a 10% interest as a general partner. The case does not explain
how the LLC could have partners classified as "general pminers" and
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"limited partners." It is unclear why the advisor didn't use a single limited
partnership as the choice of entity for the taxpayer. The 85% limited
partner interest allegedly represented goodwill, the value of which was
determined by the taxpayer's advisor but unsupported by any
documentation. A second corporation ("Westphere") was fmmed for the
purpose of providing services in connection with the taxpayer's practice,
including its management and tracking its expenses and to creating a
group eligible for medical insurance. W estphere charged the LLC
"management fees" for its alleged services.
The taxpayer's advisor provided no written explanation of the reason for
creating three entities and he never discussed with the taxpayer the basis
for the 85%/10% split between his "limited" and "general" partnership
interests. The taxpayer did not seek a second opinion from any other CPA
or attorney assessing the merits of his advisor's recommendations. There
was no valuation in support of the 85% limited partnership interest issued
for intangibles, nor was there a written assignment of the tangible or
intangible assets of the taxpayer's medical practice to the LLC.
The taxpayer paid self-employment tax only on net income allocated to
him as general partner (i.e., 10% ofLLC's net income), whereas, as a sole
proprietor, he was required to pay self-employment tax on the entire net
income from his psychiatric practice. See Sections 1401 and 1402.
The comi analyzed the facts under the two-prong test of Moline
Properties. Under this test, a corporation is recognized as a separate legal
entity if either:
(1)

The purpose of its formation is the equivalent of business
activity.

(2)

The incorporation is followed by the carrymg on of a
business by the corporation.

Under the first prong, the court found that both Robucci P.C. and
Westphere were formed solely to reduce the taxpayer's tax liability and
not with a business purpose (i.e., there was no equivalent of business
activity on corporate formation). With respect to Westphere, the court
concluded that its only activity was the equivalent of "taking money from
one pocket and putting it into another." Under the second prong of the
Moline Properties test, the court found that both Robucci P.C. and
Westphere "were, essentially, hollow corporate shells," which lead to the
conclusion that "neither carried on a business after incorporation." Thus,
the court disregarded both corporations.
Because Robucci P.C. was disregarded for tax purposes, the court found
that the LLC had only one owner, the taxpayer. Because no election was
made to classify the LLC as a corporation, the LLC was disregarded and
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its owner was treated as a sole proprietor. Consequently, the taxpayer was
treated as a sole proprietor for federal tax purposes, which was his status
before formation of the three entities. See Reg.§§ 301.7701-1 through -3.
9.

The Renkemeyer Case. In Renkemeyer, Campbell & Weaver, LLP v.
Comm 'r, 136 TC 137 (2011), the Tax Court disallowed a law firm's
special allocation of business income and held that the firm's attomey
partners were liable for self-employment tax on allocations of partnership
income related to the law finn's legal practice.
Renkemeyer, Campbell & Weaver, LLP is a Kansas law firm. During the
2004 tax year, the firm's partners included three attomeys and RCGW
Investment Management, Inc., a subchapter S corporation that was wholly
owned by an Employee Stock Ownership Plan and Trust (the "ESOP")
benefiting the three attomeys. The law fi1m timely filed its partnership tax
retum for the 2004 tax year, which allocated 87.557% of the law firm's
net income to the ESOP. The IRS issued an FPAA for tax years 2000,
2001, and 2002 to the law firm, which:
(1)

Disallowed the special allocation to the ESOP and
dete1mined that net business income should be reallocated
to the partners consistent with the profit and loss sharing
percentages reported on the partners' respective Schedules
K-1.

(2)

Determined that the partners' distributive shares of the law
firm's net business income were subject to selfemployment tax.

Although the law firm asserted that the special allocation to the ESOP was
proper under the partnership agreement, it could not produce a copy of the
partnership agreement for the record. Therefore, the court looked to the
partners' respective interests in the partnership to determine whether the
special allocation had economic reality. Based on an analysis of relative
capital contributions, distribution rights, and profit and loss sharing
percentages, the court concluded that the special allocation of the law
firm's net business income for the 2004 tax year was improper and should
be disallowed.
Section 1402(a) provides several exclusions from the general selfemployment tax rule, including an exclusion under Section 1402(a)(13) for
the distributive share of any item of income or loss of a limited partner
(other than guaranteed payments in the nature of remuneration for
services). Because the term "limited partner" is not defined in the statute,
the court had to determine whether an attomey partner who provides
services in a law firm structured as a limited liability partnership can be
treated as a "limited partner" for purposes of the exclusion under
Section 1402(a)(13).
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The court examined the statute's legislative history, which revealed that
the intent of Section 1402(a)(13) was to ensure that individuals who merely
invest in a partnership and do not actively participate in the partnership's
business operations (which was the archetype of limited partners at the
time) do not receive credits toward Social Security coverage. The court
detennined that the legislative history did not contemplate excluding
partners who performed services for a partnership in their capacity as
partners (i.e., acting in the manner of self-employed persons) from liability
for self-employment taxes. Because nearly all of the law fum's revenues
were derived from legal services performed by the attorney partners in
their capacities as partners, the comt detetmined that the partners'
distributive shares of the law firm's income did not arise as a return on the
pmtners' investment and were not "earnings which are basically of an
investment nature." Therefore, the comt held that the attorney partners'
distributive shares arising from legal services they performed on behalf of
the law firm were subject to self-employment taxes. Because the law fnm
was formed as a limited liability pmtnership rather than a limited
pmtnership, it did not actually have "limited" or "general" partners as
would a limited partnership.
10.

The Howell Case. In Howell v. Comm 'r, TCM 2012-303. the Tax Court
held a couple liable for self-employment tax under Section 1401 on
payments made to the wife by their LLC, fmding that the couple could not
disavow the reporting position they took on the company's returns by later
arguing the payments were partnership distributions rather than guaranteed
payments.
In Howell, the taxpayers, husband and wife, formed a California limited
liability company to provide software and hardware to hospitals consisting
of a remote access system that enabled doctors to access hospital records
from outside the hospital. When the LLC was first organized, Mr. Howell
decided to make Mrs. Howell a member of the LLC rather than himself for
various reasons. On the LLC's tax returns, the LLC treated the amounts in
issue as guaranteed payments to Mrs. Howell. The taxpayers later argued
that these guaranteed payments actually represented distributions from the
LLC to Mrs. Howell on which no self-employment tax was owed.
In its decision, the Tax Court cited its earlier decision in Renkemeyer, for
the proposition that the legislative history of Section 1402(a)(13) does not
contemplate excluding partners who perform services for a pmtnership in
their capacity as partners from liability for self-employment taxes, and that
the Section 1402(a)(13) exemption was only meant to exclude from selfemployment income the distributive share of individuals who merely
invested in the partnership and who were not actively participating in the
partnership's business operations, and whose distributive shares were
earnings "basically of an investment nature." Specifically, the court in
Renkemeyer held that the taxpayers were not limited partners for purposes
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of Section 1402(a)(13) because the distributive shares received arose from
legal services perfmmed on behalf of the law firm by the taxpayers and
did not arise as a return on the taxpayers' investment in the law fitm.
While the Tax Court held that Mrs. Howell was subject to SE Tax with
respect to her guaranteed payments, it did not strictly follow Renkemeyer
(which would have required a holding that Mrs. Howell was not a limited
partner). Instead, holding Mrs. Howell to the form of transaction she
chose, the court concluded that the record established that Mrs. Howell
performed services for their LLC and that she was not a passive investor,
that the payments made to her were for services rendered and that Mrs.
Howell did not satisfy her burden of proving that such payments did not
constitute payments for services rendered.
Observation. The Howell case, as well as the Tax Court's prior decision
in Renkemeyer, indicate that it will be difficult for an LLC member to be
treated as "limited partner" under Section 1402(a)(l3) for purposes of
excluding his or her distributive share of the income of the LLC from the
self-employment tax any time such member provides services to or on
behalf of the LLC and who is characterized other than as a passive
investor of the LLC. This should be contrasted with a shareholder of an S
corporation who materially participates in the business, where only
amounts paid as reasonable salary should be subject to Social Security
taxes on such wages, and the shareholder's distributive share of the
income of the S corporation and all dividend distributions should be
exempt from the self-employment tax and Social Security taxes by reason
of Rev. Rul. 59-221, 1959-1, CB 225, and Section 1402(a)(2). An S
corporation shareholder who materially participates in an active trade or
business canied on by an S corporation should also not be subject to the
new tax imposed on net investment income with respect to such
shareholder's distributive share of the S corporation's income by virtue of
Section 1411(c)(2)(A).14
11.

The Riether Case. In Riether v. Comm 'r, 919 F. Supp. 2d 1140, 112
AFTR2d 2013-6074 (DC N.M. 2012), the court rejected on summary
judgment a radiologist's and his wife's claim that they were not liable for
self-employment tax on their distributive share of income from a
diagnostic imaging LLC taxed as a partnership. Although not clear from
the facts of the case, presumably all of the income of the diagnostic
imaging LLC was attributable to the "facility fee or "technical
component" of the imaging services provided. by the LLC rather than for.
professional medical (reading) services.

14

The Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, H.R. 4872, P.L. 111-152, imposes a 3.8% Medicare
tax on the lesser of(a) net investment income or (b) the excess ofmodified adjusted gross income over $250,000 in
the case of taxpayers filing a joint return and over $200,000 for other taxpayers. The definition of net investment
income is quite expansive for purposes of the new 3.8% Medicare tax imposed under Section 1411(a)(1).
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The LLC actually issued W-2s to husband and wife showing salaries or
wages paid by the LLC to each of them for a portion of the LLC's income.
For the balance of the LLC's income, K-ls were issued to husband and
wife on which they did not pay self-employment tax.
Citing Rev. Rul. 69-184, 1969-1 CB 256, the court stated that the LLC
should have treated all of the LLC's income as self-employment income,
rather than characterizing some of it as wages. Specifically, Rev. Rul. 69184 states that members of a partnership are not employees of the
pminership for purposes of self-employment taxes. Rather, a pminer who
pmiicipates in the partnership business is "a self-employed individual."
The court found that the LLC's improper treatment of the "wages" income
futiher undermined the taxpayers' simplistic argument that they owed no
self-employment taxes simply because they received W -2s.
The taxpayers also argued that the income of the LLC was "unearned
income," and as such, was not subject to the self-employment tax. The
couti stated that simply labeling income as "unearned income" does not
exempt such amounts from the self-employment tax. Rather, the court
reiterated that the self-employment tax applies to a taxpayer's distributive
share of all partnership income with only certain limited exceptions.
Citing Section 1402(a)(13), which exempts from the self-employment tax
a limited partner's distributive share of income from a limited partnership,
and the Renkemeyer case, the court concluded that the taxpayers were not
members of a limited partnership, nor did they resemble limited patiners,
which are those who "lack management powers but enjoy immunity from
liability for debts of the pminership." Thus, whether the taxpayers were
active or passive in the production of the LLC's earnings, those earnings
were self-employment income, subject to the self-employment tax.
12.

ILM 201436049. In ILM 201436049 (9/5/2014), the IRS found that
members of a management company LLC ("Management Company")
were not "limited partners" within the meaning of Section 1402(a)(13) and
therefore were subject to the self-employment tax on their distributive
shares of income of the Management Company.

Under the facts of the mling, a limited liability company classified as a
partnership for federal tax purposes served as the investment manager for
"Managed Fund," a family of investment partnership funds that carry on
extensive trading and investing activity (the "Funds").
The Management Company generally has full authority and responsibility
to manage and control the affairs and business of the Funds. The
Management Company is primarily responsible for carrying out the
extensive market research and trading activity of each of the Funds, and
carries on all investment activities, such as the purchasing, managing,
restmcturing and selling of the Funds' investment assets. Members of the
Management Company and its employees provide these extensive services
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to the Funds. The Management Company's primary source of income is
In
from fees for providing management services to the Funds.
consideration of the Management Company's services, the limited
partnership agreements of each of the Funds provide for payment of a
quarterly "management fee" from the Funds to The Management
Company. For the years in issue, the Management Company's gross
receipts were entirely attributable to management fees for providing
services to the Funds, and the Management Company's ordinary business
income was comprised entirely of income from management fees.
Additionally, in the years in issue, each member of the Management
Company worked full time for the Management Company, performing a
wide-range of professional services. Each of the members receives a
Form W-2 from the Management Company for specified wage amounts.
For the years in issue, the Management Company treated all of its
members as "limited partners" not subject to the self-employment tax on
their distributive share of the Management Company's income. The only
amounts reported as subject to self-employment tax were guaranteed
payments representing health insurance premiums and parking benefits
paid on behalf of the members by the Management Company.
The Management Company argued that the "wage" amounts represent
"reasonable compensation" for each member of the Management
Company, and that each member is a limited partner with respect to their
distributive share of the income of the Management Company. The
Management Company reasoned that because the Management Company
has the same role in the business as the S corporation it succeeded, it can
continue to apply the same "reasonable compensation" wage rules
applicable to S corporations.
The ruling relies heavily on the legislative history behind Section
1402(a)( 13) and the Renkemeyer and Riether cases discussed above.
Specifically, Section 1402(a)(13) provides that there shall be excluded
from self-employment income the distributive share of any item of income
or loss of a limited partner, as such, other than guaranteed payments
described in Section 707(c) to that member for services actually rendered
to or on behalf of the partnership to the extent that those payments are
established to be in the nature of remuneration for those services.
The legislative histmy for the exception in Section 1402(a)(13) clarifies
that Congress did not intend to allow service partners in a service
partnership acting in the manner of self-employed persons to avoid paying
self-employment tax. The ruling goes on to cite the Renkemeyer case, in
which the Tax Couti found that the attorney-partners of an LLP engaged
in the practice of law who were lawyers performing services for the LLP
were not limited partners within the meaning of Section 1402(a)(13) for
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purposes of excluding their distributive share of the income of the LLP
from the self-employment tax. The Tax Court in Renkemeyer went on to
provide that the share of the law film's income did not arise as a return on
the partners' investment and were not "earnings which are basically of an
investment nature."
The mling goes on to cite the Riether case discussed above, where the
court granted the government's motion for summary judgment on the issue
of whether a husband and wife were subject to self-employment tax on
their distributive share of income from an LLC. In the Riether case, the
court concluded that Section 1402(a)(13) only applies to limited partners
and not to taxpayers treated as a general partner, "irrespective of the
nature of his membership." The court went on to find that the taxpayers
were not members of a limited partnership, nor did they resemble limited
partners, which are those who "lack management powers but enjoy
immunity from liability for debts of the partnership." The Riether case
concluded that whether the taxpayers were active or passive in the
production of the LLC's earnings, those earnings were self-employment
income subject to the self-employment tax.
The mling goes on to provide that the Management Company's members
perfmmed extensive investment and operational management services for
the Management Company in their capacity as members (i.e., acting in the
mallller of self-employed persons) and that the Management Company
derives its income from the investment management services performed
by its members. The IRS concluded that the income earned by the
members through the Management Company was not income which was
"basically of an investment nature" of the sort that Congress sought to
exclude from self-employment tax when it enacted the predecessor to
Section 1402(a)(l3). Additionally, the IRS stated that like the situation in
Renkemeyer, the members' earnings were not in the nature of a return on
capital investment, even though the members paid more than a nominal
amount for their membership interests. Rather, the IRS found that the
earnings of each member from the Management Company were a direct
result of the services rendered on behalf of the Management Company by
such members. The IRS also stated that similar to Riether, the
Management Company cannot change the character of its members'
distributive shares by paying a portion of each member's distributive share
as amounts mislabeled as so-called "wages," citing Rev. Rul. 69-184,
1969-1, C.B. 256.
Finally, the IRS expressly stated that because The Management Company
was not an S corporation, the "reasonable compensation" rules applicable
to S corporations do not apply (which will be discussed below and are a
major advantage of operating as an S corporation rather than as an LLC).

F.

S CORPORATIONS
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Because the Federal Insurance Contributions Act ("FICA") and Federal
Unemployment Tax Act ("FUTA") taxes may be substantial, many shareholderemployees of S corporations have employed a strategy of decreasing the amount
of wages that they receive from the S corporation and correspondingly increasing
the amount of S corporation distributions made to them.
1.

Social Security Taxes on Wages. As part of FICA, a tax is imposed on
employees and employers up to a prescribed maximum amount of
employee wages. This tax is comprised of two parts, the Old-Age,
Survivor, and Disability Insurance (OASDI) portion and the Medicare
Hospital Insurance (HI) portion. The HI tax rate is 1.45% on both the
employer and the employee, and the OASDI tax rate is 6.2% on both the
employer and the employee. The maximum wages subject to the OASDI
tax rate for 2014 is $117,000.
RRA '93 repealed the dollar limit on wages and self-employment income
subject to the HI portion of the FICA tax as well as the self-employment
tax. Thus, employers and employees will equally be subject to the 1.45%
HI tax on all wages, and self-employed individuals will be subject to the
2.9% HI tax on all self-employment income.
As discussed above, beginning in 2013, the HI portion of the Social
Security tax will be increased from 2.9% (combined employer and
employee) to 3.8% (combined employer and employee) for wages in
excess of $250,000 for married individuals filing jointly and in excess of
$200,000 for other taxpayers. Additionally, as discussed above, beginning
in 2013, a taxpayer having modified adjusted gross income in excess of
$250,000 in the case of mmTied individuals filing jointly and $200,000 for
other taxpayers will be subject to the 3.8% net investment income tax.

2.

Social Security Taxes and S Corporations. In order for shareholderemployees of S corporations to realize employment tax savings by
withdrawing funds in the fmm of distributions rather than compensation,
such distributions must not be recharacterized as "wages" for FICA
purposes or as NESE for purposes of theSE Tax. For FICA and FUTA
purposes, Sections 3121(a) and 3306(b), respectively, define the term
"wages" to mean all remuneration for employment, including the cash
value of all remuneration (including benefits) paid in any medium other
than cash, with certain exceptions.
Although it might appear at first glance that a shareholder's distributive
share of income from an S corporation constitutes NESE since a general
partner's distributive share of the income of any trade or business carried
on by a partnership of which he is a member generally constitutes NESE
subject to the SE Tax, in Rev. Rul. 59-221, 1959-1 C.B. 225, the IRS
found that an S corporation's income does not constitute NESE for
purposes of the SE Tax. Additionally, Section 1402(a)(2) specifically
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excludes from the definition of NESE dividends on shares of stock issued
by a corporation.
Consequently, neither a shareholder's distributive share of income passed
through from the S corporation under Section 1366 nor any S corporation
distributions actually received by the shareholder from the S corporation
constitute NESE subject to theSE Tax. In Rev. Rul. 66-327, 1966-2 C.B.
357, the IRS found that the taxable income of an S corporation included in
its shareholders' gross income is not income derived from a trade or
business for purposes of computing the shareholders' net operating losses
under Section 172(c). Similarly in Ltr. Rul. 8716060, the IRS concluded
that the income derived by a shareholder-employee from an S corporation
did not constitute net eamings from self-employment for self-employment
tax purposes and that such taxpayer was not eligible to adopt a qualified
pension plan based on the income derived fi·om his S corporation since
such income did not constitute eamed income.
Because wages paid to shareholder-employees of S corporations are
subject to Social Security taxes while S corporation distributions are not,
shareholder-employees have an opportunity for significant tax savings by
withdrawing funds from the S corporation in the fmm of distributions
rather than wages. Prior to advising an S corporation with shareholderemployees to undertake such a tax planning strategy, however, the tax
practitioner should analyze the economic and tax consequences that such a
strategy will have on the S corporation and its shareholders. 15
Although the amount of funds available for distribution to an S
corporation's shareholder-employees will increase as the wages paid to
them decrease, all distributions made by the S corporation to its
shareholders must be made in proportion to the number of shares held by
such shareholders under Section 1361(b)(l)(D). Thus, if an S corporation
which has both shareholders who are employees and shareholders who are
not employees adopts a tax strategy to reduce Social Security taxes by
minimizing wages and maximizing distributions, the increase in the
amount of distributions received by the shareholders who are employees
will be less than the amount by which their wages were reduced (since
distributions must also be made to the shareholders who are not
employees). Additionally, a program that minimizes the amount of wages
paid to shareholder-employees will increase: (1) purchase price formulas
based on eamings; and (2) bonus formulas based on eamings. Decreasing
the amount of wages paid to shareholder-employees of S corporations also
15

See generally, Looney & Levitt, Reasonable Compensation Issues for Closely-held and Service Companies," 61st
N.Y.U. Ann. Inst. Fed. Tax'n 16 (2003); Looney & Comiter, "Reasonable Compensation: Dividends vs. Wages- A
Reverse in Positions," 7 J. Partnership Tax'n 364 (Winter 1991); Clements & StJ.·eer, "How Low Can OwnerEmployee Compensation be Set to Save on Employment Taxes?" 2 J. S. Corp. Tax'n 37 (1990); Andrews, "Current
Non-Stock Executive Compensation and Fringe Benefit Issues," 1 S Corp.: J. Tax, Leg. & Bus. Strategies 3 (1989);
and Spradling, "AreS Corp. Disn·ibutions Wages Subject to Withholding?" 71 J. Tax'n 104 (1989).
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will reduce the contribution base for contributions to the corporation's
qualified plans.
3.

S Corporations and Unreasonably Low Compensation - Reclassification Risks.
a.

In Rev. Rul. 74-44, 1974-1 C.B. 287, two shareholders of an S

corporation withdrew no salary from the corporation and arranged
for the corporation to pay them dividends equal to the amount that
they would have othetwise received as reasonable compensation
for services performed. This arrangement was made for the
express purpose of avoiding payment of federal employment taxes.
Based on the expansive definition of wages for FICA and Federal
Unemployment Tax Act ("FUTA") purposes (which includes all
remuneration for employment), the IRS found that the dividends
paid to the shareholders constituted wages for FICA and FUTA
purposes. Rev. Rul. 74-44 did not, however, address the issue of
what constitutes reasonable compensation in the S corporation
context since the ruling expressly stated that the dividends were
received by the shareholder-employees in lieu of the reasonable
compensation that would have otherwise been paid to them.
Despite this shortcoming, Rev. Rul. 74-44 clearly indicates that the
payment of no compensation will be umeasonable where
shareholder-employees provide substantial services to the
corporation. 16
b.

In Radtke v. US., 895 F.2d 1196 (7th Cir. 1990), the court
recharacterized distributions made to the sole shareholder (an
attorney) of an S corporation (a law firm) as wages subject to
FICA and FUTA taxes, where the shareholder made all of his
withdrawals from the S corporation in the fonn of S corporation
distributions and received no salary from the S corporation during
the tax year. The court relied on a broad definition of wages for
FICA and FUTA purposes as all remuneration for employment,
and concluded that the dividend payments were remuneration for
services performed by the shareholder for the S corporation.
Likewise, in Spicer Accounting, Incorporated v. US., 918 F.2d 80
(9th Cir. 1990), the court recharacterized dividend distributions
made to a shareholder (an accountant) of an S corporation (an
accounting firm) as wages subject to FICA and FUTA taxes where
the shareholder received no salary during the tax year.

16

See also Rev. Rul. 71-86, 1971-1 C.B. 285 (president and sole shareholder of closely-held corporation found to be
an "employee" of the corporation for employment tax purposes); Rev. Rul. 73-361, 1973-2 C.B. 331 (officershareholder of an S corporation who performed substantial services as an officer of the S corporation is an
"employee" of the corporation for purposes of FICA, FUTA and income tax withholding); and Ltr. Rul. 7949022
(shareholder-employees of S corporation who perform substantial services for S corporation treated as "employees"
for employment tax purposes).
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c.

Additionally, in Fred R. Esser, P.C. v. US., 750 F. Supp. 421 (D.
Ariz. 1990), the court recharacterized amounts received by the sole
shareholder, officer and director of a legal services S corporation,
as wages subject to FICA and FUTA taxes, rather than as
distributions. As in the Radtke and Spicer Accounting cases, the
shareholder received no salmy from the S corporation during the
tax year.

d.

In Donald G. Cave, A Professional Law Cmp. v. Comm'r, 109
AFTR2d 91 2012-609 (5th Cir. 2012), ajf'g per curiam, TCM
2011-48, the court held that all of the non -shareholder attomeys, as
well as a law clerk, of a law finn were common law employees
rather than independent contractors, and also recharacterized the
distributions made to the sole shareholder of the law firm, who was
detennined to be a statutory employee, as wages subject to Social
Security taxes.

e.

In David E. Watson P.C. v. US., 668 F.3d 1008 (8th Cir. 2012),
aff'g 757 F. Supp. 2d 877 (S.D. Iowa 2010), the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the district court
recharacterizing a significant portion of dividend distributions
made by an S corporation to its sole shareholder as wages subject
to Social Security taxes.

During the years in issue, 2002 and 2003, David E. Watson, CPA
("Watson"), provided accounting services to a palinership
("LWBJ") and its clients as an employee of David E. Watson P.C.,
an S corporation (the "S Corporation"). The S Corporation was a
25% partner in LWBJ. The IRS made assessments against Watson
after it detetmined that portions of the dividend distributions from
the S Corporation to Watson should be recharacterized as wages
subject to employment taxes. Specifically, the IRS contended that
$130,730.05 out of a total of $203,651 of dividend payments to
Watson for 2002 should be recharacterized as wages subject to
employment taxes, and that $175,470 out of a total of$203,651 of
dividend payments to Watson for 2003 should be recharacterized
as wages subject to employment taxes. In both years, Watson
received a salary of $24,000 in addition to the dividend
distributions.
In his Motion for Summary Judgment, Watson argued that the
intent of the S Corporation was controlling in determining the
characterization of the payments from the S Corporation to
Watson. Because the S Corporation clearly intended to pay
Watson compensation of only $24,000 per year, Watson contended
that any amounts distributed in excess of the $24,000 were
properly classified as dividends. In support ofhis position, Watson
cited Electric & Neon, Inc. v. Comm 'r, 56 TC 1324 (1971); Paula
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Construction Co. v. Comm 'r, 58 TC 1055 (1972), and Pediatric
Surgical Associates, P.C. v. Comm 'r, TCM 2001-81.
Citing Rev. Rul. 74-44, 1974-1 CB 287, Radtke, Spicer Accounting
and Veterinary Surgical Consultants, the district court found that
the intent of the S Corporation was not controlling in determining
the character of the payments, but rather that the analysis turns on
whether the payments at issue were made as remuneration for
services perfonned. Consequently, the court denied Watson's
Motion for Summary Judgment because it found that there was a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether the dividends paid to
Watson by the S Corporation were remuneration for services
perfonned subject to employment taxes.
After denying the taxpayer's Motion for Summary Judgment, the
district court held a bench trial on the merits. At trial, the
government's expert opined that the market value of Watson's
accounting services was approximately $91,044 per year for 2002
and 2003. The government's expert was a general engineer with
the IRS and had worked on approximately 20 to 30 cases involving
reasonable compensation issues. In forming his opinion as to
Watson's salaty, the government's expert relied on several
compensation surveys and studies particularly relating to
accountants. The district court ultimately adopted the government
expert witness's opinion and determined that the reasonable
amount of Watson's remuneration for services performed totaled
$91,044 for each of2002 and 2003.
In addition to determining the issues of what constituted
reasonable compensation to the sole shareholder of the S
corporation and whether intent was the dete1minative factor in
determining whether payments from an S corporation to its sole
shareholder should be characterized as wages or as dividend
distributions, the court first addressed the taxpayer's argument that
the district court erred in allowing the government's expert to
testify on the issue of reasonable compensation because he was not
competent to testify on that issue. Specifically, the taxpayer
asserted that the government's expert witness was not qualified,
changed his opinion, relied on insufficient underlying facts, and
used flawed methods in rendering his opinion. After reviewing all
of these factors in detail, the court of appeals determined that the
district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the testimony
of the government's expert witness, and found the taxpayer's
arguments meritless.
In reaching its decision, the Eighth Circuit cited Rev. Rul. 74-44,
Radtke, Spicer Accounting and Veterinary Surgical Consultants
cases (discussed above), and concluded that the district court
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properly determined that the characterization of funds disbursed by
an S corporation to its shareholders turns on an analysis of whether
the payments at issue were made as remuneration for services
performed. The court went on to state that the district court found
that the S corporation understated wage payments to its sole
shareholder by $67,044 in each year based on a variety of factors.
These factors included the following evidence: (1) Watson was an
exceedingly qualified accountant with an advanced degree and
nearly 20 years in accounting and taxation; (2) Watson worked 3545 hours per week as one of the primary earners in a reputable
finn, which had earnings much greater than comparable firms; (3)
the partnership had gross eamings of over $2M in 2002 and nearly
$3M in 2003; (4) $24,000 is umeasonably low compared to other
similarly situated accountants; (5) given the financial position of
the partnership, Watson's experience and his contributions to the
partnership, a $24,000 salary was exceedingly low when compared
to the roughly $200,000 the partnership distributed to Watson's S
corporation in 2002 and 2003; and (6) the fair market value of
Watson's services was $91,034.
The Eighth Circuit next addressed the taxpayer's argument that
instead of focusing on reasonableness, the district court should
have focused on the S corporation's intent. While acknowledging
that § 162(a)(1) provides that the deductibility of compensation is a
two prong test in that the compensation must both be reasonable in
amount and in fact payments purely for services, the court, citing
Elliotts, Inc. v. Comm 'r, 716 F.2d 1241, 83-2 USTC ~9610 (9th
Cir. 1983), rev'g TCM 1980-282, stated that courts usually only
need to examine the first prong since the reasonableness prong
generally subsumes the inquiry into compensatory intent in most
cases. The court did state however, that in certain rare cases
whether there is evidence that an otherwise reasonable
compensation payment contains a disguised dividend, the inquiry
may expand into compensatory intent apart from reasonableness.
In the case, the taxpayer cited Pediatric Surgical Associates in
support of his position that taxpayer intent controls in FICA tax
characterization cases. The Eighth Circuit found that even if intent
does control, after evaluating all the evidence, the district court
specifically found that the shareholder's asse1tion that the S
corporation intended to pay him a salary of only $24,000 a year to
be less than credible. Additionally, the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals went on to reject the argument made by the taxpayer that
Pediatric Surgical Associates limited the amount that could be
characterized as wages to the amount of revenue each shareholderemployee personally generated less expenses since, like Pediatric
Surgical Associates, nonshareholder-employees also contributed to
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the S corporation's earnings. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
brushed this argument aside by saying that although they thought
evidence of shareholder-employee billings and collections may be
probative on the issue of compensation, in light of all the evidence
presented to the district court in the case, they saw no elTor and
affirmed the decision of the district court.
f.

In Herbert v. Comm 'r, TC Summ. Op. 2012-124, the Tax Court
recharacterized a portion of the amounts the taxpayer claimed were
used to pay business expenses as wages subject to Social Security
taxes, finding the taxpayer's salary was unreasonably low.
However, the Tax Court expressly rejected the IRS's contention
that the taxpayer's salary be increased by $52,600, primarily based
on the salaty paid by the S corporation to the shareholder in a prior
year in which the business was not owned by the taxpayer.
In reaching this decision, the Tax Court believed and accepted the
taxpayer's testimony that the taxpayer in fact paid significant
expenses of the corporation with cash funds received from the
corporation. Additionally, the court found that in spite of limited
evidence before them, they believed that it was improper and
excessive to charge the taxpayer with receipt from the corporation
in 2007 of $52,600 in additional wages. On the other hand, the
court stated that the taxpayer's reported wages of $2,400 was
unreasonably low.
Consequently, citing Mayson Manufacturing Co. v. Comm 'r, 178
F.2d 115 (6 1h Cir. 1949), the Tax Court averaged the taxpayer's
wages for 2002 through 2006, and used the average amount as the
total for the taxpayer's 2007 wages subject to employment taxes
($30,445).

g.

(

In Sean McClary Ltd., Inc. v. Comm 'r, TC Summ. Op. 2013-62,
the Tax Court recharacterized the distributions made by an S
corporation to its sole shareholder as wages subject to Social
Security taxes where the shareholder received no salary from the S
corporation and also found that the annual compensation formula
contained in the Board of Directors minutes setting a salary of
$24,000 was unreasonably low.
Mr. McClary was the president, secretary, treasurer, sole director
and sole shareholder of his S corporation. He managed all aspects
of the S corporation's operations, including recruiting and
supervising sales agents, conducting real estate sales, procuring
advertising, purchasing supplies, and maintaining basic books and
records, Mr. McClary often worked 12-hour days with few days
off. For the year in issue, Mr. McClary supervised eight sales
agents, four of whom generated sales commissions for the S
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corporation that year, but most of the S corporation's gross receipts
were attributable to sales commissions generated by Mr. McClary
himself.
For the year in issue, the S corporation did not issue a form W-2,
Wage and Tax Statement, to Mr. McClary, nor did it claim a
deduction for the amount paid to Mr. McClary as wages or
compensation for services. During such year, Mr. McClary
transferr-ed a total of $240,000 fi·om the S corporation's account to
his personal account.
In determining what portion of the $240,000 of distributions
should be recharacterized as wages, the IRS's expert witness found
that $100,755 represented reasonable compensation for services
rendered by Mr. McClary for the year in issue. On the other hand,
Mr. McClaty argued that even though he did not pay himself a
salary, the salary of $24,000 set forth in the compensation
anangement in the corporation's minutes should be the only
amount characterized as wages subject to Social Security taxes.
The Tax Court, citing the multi-factor test used in determining
reasonable compensation for shareholder employees of C
corporations, found that reasonable compensation for Mr.
McClary's services during the year in issue was $83,200, and as
such, recharacterized $83,200 of the $240,000 distributed by the S
corporation to Mr. McClary as wages subject to Social Security
taxes.
h.

In Glass Blocks Unlimited v. Comm'r, TCM 2013-180, the Tax

Court recharacterized the total distributions made by an S
corporation to its president, sole shareholder and only full-time
employee, of $30,844 in 2007 and $31,644 in 2008, as wages
subject to Social Security taxes.
Citing Veterinary Surgical Consultants P. C. v. Comm 'r, 17 that an
officer who performs more than minor services for a corporation
and receives remuneration in any form for those services is
considered an employee, and his or her wages are subject to the
employer's payment of federal employment taxes. The court went
on to fmd that the taxpayer was the S corporation's only officer,
and sole full-time worker in 2007 and 2008 and performed
substantially all the work necessary to operate the business.
The Tax Court went on to reject the taxpayer's argument that the
distributions constituted repayment of shareholder loans, and the
taxpayer's argument that the characterization of all distributions
17

117 TC 141 (2001), affd Sub Nom. Yeagle Drywall Co. v. Comm'r, 54 Fed. Appx. 100 (2nd Cir. 2002).
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from the S corporation to him as wages constituted unreasonably
high compensation to him, citing the multi-factor test used in
Elliotts, Inc. v. Comm 'r. 18 Consequently, the Tax Court found that
the total amount of distributions made by the S corporation to its
sole shareholder constituted wages subject to Social Security taxes
for the years in issue.
The Herbert, Watson and McClary cases involve situations where
only a portion of amounts not treated as wages are recharacterized
as wages subject to Social Security taxes, and each involves
different methods in determining what constitutes "reasonable
compensation" to the shareholder-employees of an S corporation.

(
18

i.

The Watson case, the Herbert case and the McClary case are the
first reported decisions in which the court was presented with a
situation which was riot clearly abusive such as those presented in
Radtke and Spicer Accounting (i.e, where all of the earnings of the
S corporations were paid to the sole shareholder as dividend
distributions and no salary was paid to the shareholder by the S
corporation). Consequently, the Watson, Herbert and McClary
decisions represent impmiant victories for the IRS in being able to
recharacterize dividend distributions as wages where at least some
(but less than a reasonable) salary has been paid to the shareholderemployees of the S corporation. On the other hand, these cases can
be viewed as favorable to taxpayers as they allowed personal
service S corporations to distribute some amount of their income
without being subject to Social Security taxes. However, the
Watson case is somewhat troubling in its rejection of the decision
reached in the Pediatric Surgical Associates, P.C. case (in which
the IRS sought to recharacterize wages of a C corporation as
dividend distributions rather than vice versa), in that the court did
not seem to take into account the fact that dividend distributions
can indeed be generated by the services of nonshareholderemployees of an S corporation or from other ancillary services not
provided by the shareholder-employees of the S corporation.

j.

The Radtke, Spicer Accounting and Esser cases indicate that in
abusive situations, such as where the shareholders of an S
corporation make all withdrawals from the S corporation in the
fmm of S corporation distributions and receive no salary from the
S corporation during the tax year, the courts will recharacterize
such distributions as wages subject to Social Security taxes. These
earlier cases have been followed in more recent cases. See
Veterinary Surgical Consultants, P.C. v. Comm 'r, 117 TC 14
(2001), Van Camp and Brennion v. U.S., 251 F.3d 862 (9th Cir.
2001), Old Raleigh Realty Corp. v. Comm'r., TC Summ. Op.

716 F.2d 1241 (9th Cir. 1983) rev TCM 1980-282.
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2002-61, David E. Watson P.C. v. US., 668 F.3d 1008 (8th Cir.
2012), aff'g 757 F. Supp. 2d 877 (S.D. Iowa 2010), Herbert v.
Comm'r, TC Summ. Op. 2012-124, Sean McClary Ltd., Inc. v.
Comm 'r, TC Summ. Op. 2013-62 and Glass Blocks Unlimited v.
Comm'r, TCM 2013-180.

G.

k.

In non-abusive situations, however, the IRS may have difficulty in
successfully asserting that distributions made by S corporations to
shareholder-employees should be recharacterized as wages subject
to Social Security taxes. In order for the IRS to recharacterize S
corporation distributions as wages subject to Social Security taxes
in non-abusive situations, the IRS would have to overcome: (i) the
lack of express authority for its position (unlike the express
authority granted to the IRS under Section 1366(e) to
recharacterize dividend distributions as wages in the family
context); (ii) the burden of overcoming the initial characterization
of the payment as a distribution; and (iii) the unce1iainty
surrounding the utilization of Section 162(a)(l) by the IRS in the
employment context to bring salaries up to a reasonable level.

I.

Consequently, in such situations, a tax strategy of decreasing
wages and correspondingly increasing distributions to shareholderemployees could result in substantial employment tax savings. As
a result of this tax planning technique, the IRS, the Joint
Committee on Taxation and the Department of Treasury have
issued repmis and notices addressing the use of S corporations as a
means of avoiding the SE Tax.

RECENT ATTEMPTS TO SUBJECTS CORPORATIONS TO THE SELFEMPLOYMENT TAX
There have been numerous attempts in recent years to subject S corporation
eamings to the self-employment tax.
1.

In 2002, the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration issued a
report entitled "The Intemal Revenue Service Does Not Always Address
Subchapter S Corporation Officer Compensation During Examinations,"
(Reference No. 2002-30-125 (July 5, 2002)), where it was found that IRS
examiners failed to address officer compensation issues in 13 out of 58
cases reviewed, and it was recommended that additional technical
guidance be given to field personnel in determining reasonable officer
compensation.

2.

On April 5, 2004, the IRS issued a news release, I.R. 2004-47, identifying
several types of "schemes" to avoid the payment of employment taxes that
have resulted in adverse court rulings or convictions of taxpayers. Among
the schemes listed is "S corporation officers' compensation treated as
corporate distributions", which it describes as follows: "In an effort to
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avoid employment taxes, some corporations are improperly treating
officer compensation as a corporate distribution instead of wages or
salary. By law, officers are employees of the corporation for employment
tax purposes and compensation they have received for their services is
subject to employment taxes."
3.

In January, 2005, the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation ("JCT")
released a report titled "Options to Improve Tax Compliance and Refmm
Tax Expenditures." This report proposed that S corporations be treated as
partnerships and any shareholders of S corporations be treated as general
partners. As a result, the shareholders of the S corporation would be
subject to SE Tax on their shares of S corporation net income (whether or
not distributed) in the same manner as partners. Under the JCT's
proposal, with respect to service businesses, all shareholders' net income
from the S corporation would be treated as NESE.

4.

On May 25, 2005, J. Russell George, the Inspector General, Treasury,
Inspector General, for Tax Administration testified before the Senate
Finance Committee, complaining about the employment tax inequities that
exist between sole-proprietorships and single-shareholder S corporations.
Mr. George noted that the amount of potential employment tax collection
lost in 2000 was 5.7 billion dollars based on a comparison of the profits of
single-shareholder S corporations and the amounts shown by the single
shareholder as compensation subject to employment tax. In connection
with that testimony, Pamela Gardiner, Deputy Inspector General for Audit
of the Inspector General for Tax Administration issued a final audit report
entitled "Actions are Needed to Eliminate Inequities in the Employment
Tax Liabilities of Sole-Proprietorships and Single-Shareholder S
Corporations."

5.

In July, 2005, the IRS announced its plan to conduct an intensive study of
5,000 randomly selected S corporations. The IRS repmis that the study
will be used to more accurately gauge the extent to which the income,
deductions and credits from S corporations are properly reported on
returns and will assist the IRS in selecting and auditing S corporation
returns with greater compliance risks. While the notice did not specify
that compliance with the SE Tax rules is a focus of the study, it is not
difficult to imagine that the SE Tax was one of the issues that will be
closely watched.

6.

In conjunction with its 2005 report, the Senate Finance Committee
released a report on October 19, 2006 entitled "Additional Options to
Improve Tax Compliance" that was prepared by the members of the JCT.
The repmi addressed, among other things, a proposal that would generally
treat service partnerships, LLCs and S corporations the same for SE Tax
purposes, so that a partner's, member's or shareholder's distributive share
of income from a service entity would be subject to the SE Tax. The
proposal sought to eliminate the "choice of business form" decision that
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results in substantially different tax liability for otherwise similar forms of
business.
7.

In reaction to this "controversial and politically charged" report, the
Partnerships and LLCs Committee and the S Corporations Committee of
the American Bar Association published their comments. These comments
suggested, among other things, that the rules cunently in effect for S
corporations were conect and should not be changed.

8.

Senator Rangel introduced a Bill in 2007 that would essentially subject all
income from a service entity, whether a partnership, LLC or S corporation,
to the SE Tax.

9.

The Joint Committee on Taxation again addressed theSE Tax issue in JCT
Report (JCX-48-08) on Selected Federal Tax Reform Issues Relating to
Small Business, Choice of Entity for a June 5, 2008, Senate Finance
Committee Hearing.

10.

In IRS Fact Sheet FS-2008-25, the IRS clarified infmmation that small
business taxpayers should understand regarding the tax law for corporate
officers who perfmm services for S corporations. In the Fact Sheet, the
IRS points out that just because an officer is also a shareholder of the S
corporation, it does not change the requirement that payments to the
corporate officer must be treated as wages, and that courts have
consistently held that S corporation officer-shareholders who provide
more than minor services to the corporation and who receive or are
entitled to receive payments are employees whose compensation is subject
to federal employment taxes.

The Fact Sheet goes on to discuss that although there are no "bright line"
tests for detetmining what constitutes "reasonable compensation" to S
corporation officer-shareholders, the following factors have been
considered by the comis in determining reasonable compensation:
a.

Training and experience.

b.

Duties and responsibilities.

c.

Time and effort devoted to the business.

d.

Dividend histmy.

e.

Payments to non-shareholder employees.

f.

Timing and manner of paying bonuses to key people.

g.

What comparable business pay for similar services.

h.

Compensation agreements.
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i.

The use of a formula to dete1mine compensation.

11.

Faris Fink, Commissioner of the Small Business and Self-Employed
Division of the IRS, stated on October 29, 2008 that over the next 12
months the Small Business and Self-Employed Division of the IRS will
focus on taxpayer services and increased enforcement, and that S
corporations "will be a significant compliance challenge going forward,"
noting that the Small Business and Self-Employed Division must cany out
a better examination of S corporations and how they are used.

12.

On January 15, 2010, the United States Govemment Accountability Office
("GAO") released a report entitled "Tax Gap: Actions Needed to Address
Noncompliance with S Corporation Tax Rules" (the "Report") (December
15, 2009, GA0-10-195). The author participated in the GAO study as part
of a group of individuals who are members of the S Corporations
Committee of the American Bar Association ("ABA") Tax Section. This
group of individuals also included the immediate past Chair of the S
Corporations Committee, Tom Nichols. The participation of such persons
in the study was solely as individuals and not as representatives of the S
Corporations Committee or the ABA Tax Section.
The involvement of this group included participating in a preliminary
telephone call with GAO representatives, the review of a list of "S
corporation Interview Topics" prepared by the GAO, and a lengthy
follow-up telephone conference with GAO representatives.
The purpmied purpose of the GAO study was to look at "compliance
challenges" for S corporations and their shareholders. The genesis of the
GAO study seems to be the report released on October 19, 2006 entitled
"Additional Options to Improve Tax Compliance" that was prepared by
members of the Joint Committee on Taxation. The purpose of this repmi
was to find ways to close the "tax gap." Simply defined, the "tax gap" is
the difference between the federal income tax that taxpayers should be
paying if they fully complied with the federal tax laws currently in effect,
and the actual amount of federal income taxes being paid by taxpayers.
The repmi addressed, among other things, a proposal that would generally
treat service pa1inerships, LLCs and S corporations the same for selfemployment tax purposes, so that a partner's, member's or shareholder's
distributive share of income from a service entity would be subject to the
self-employment tax. The proposal sought to eliminate the "choice of
business fmm" decision that results in substantially different tax liability
for otherwise similar forms of business.
In reaction to this controversial and politically charged report, the
American Bar Association Tax Section issued comments which provided,
among other things, that the rules currently in effect for S corporations
were conect and should not be changed. Specifically, the report provided
that the self-employment tax, as well as FICA and FUTA taxes, were
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meant to be imposed on income from labor and that the IRS has all the
necessary "tools" in place to combat abusive situations where S
corporations are not paying their shareholder-employees reasonable
compensation. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 74-44, 1974-1 C.B. 287, Radtke v.
US., 895 F.2d 1196 (7th Cir. 1990), and Spicer Accounting, Inc. v. US.,
918 F.2d 80 (9th Cir. 1990). Specifically, the ABA Tax Section stated the
following:
Such a wholesale expansion of the base would not simply
close the "tax gap"; instead it would represent a significant
change in law for numerous closely-held businesses that are
complying cunently with the law. (ABA Section of
Taxation Comments on Additional Options to Improve Tax
Compliance Proposed by the Staff of J. Comm. on Tax'n at
44 (August 3, 2006)).
As stated above, although the purpose of the new GAO study was
purportedly to look at compliance challenges for S corporations and their
shareholders, based on the questions that were asked by the GAO as well
as the comments of GAO members, this sh1dy appears, at least in part, to
take the position that the self-employment tax should be imposed on some
or all of the income of S corporations (and in particular, S corporations
that are service corporations).
Because of the comments made by some of the GAO representatives as
well as what the group perceived as an implied bias to assume and confirm
noncompliance by S corporations, especially in connection with the
payment of Social Security taxes, the group requested that the GAO let
them review the Report before it was finalized. However, the Report was
issued without the group having an opportunity to review it, and as the
group feared, the Report contains several statements that are highly
controversial and appear to be quite misleading, including statements that
there have been "long-standing problems with S corporation compliance"
and that there was misreporting on 68% of S corporation income tax
returns. Although not expressly stated, the clear implication of the Report
is that S corporations are somehow abenantly noncompliant and abusive.
As will be explained in more detail below, the statements made by the
GAO seem unwarranted, based upon the Report itself as well as other
publicly available information. Consequently, Tom Nichols submitted a
Records Request to the GAO to find out what, if any, evidence had been
gathered by the GAO to support these and other controversial conclusions
contained in the Report.
To the surprise of the group, the GAO notified Mr. Nichols that the Senate
Finance Committee, as the Requester of the Report, refitsed to authorize
the release of any information relating to the Report. To put it simply, the
members of the group were shocked at the response of the GAO and
Senate Finance Committee, especially at a time when the President and the
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Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service are demanding
"transparency" from taxpayers and are stating publicly that the
government will also be transparent in its actions. The problem is
compounded by the fact that it has now been reported that ce1tain closed
door negotiations relating to the pending health care bills have included
discussions of the possibility of imposing the self-employment tax on
some or all of the net income of S corporations as a way to raise revenue
for these proposals. Since these proposals are being discussed in private,
there is not any information available as to what and why such proposals
are being made.
Based on the group's analysis of the GAO Report, there are at least several
respects in which the noncompliance conclusions set fmth in the Report
are misleading. First, as stated above, the clear implication of the 68%
misrepmting rate highlighted in the Report is that S corporations are
aberrantly noncompliant with the Tax Code. However, a careful review of
page 10 of the Report suggests otherwise. Although it states that "an
estimated 68% of the S corporation returns filed for tax years 2003 and
2004 misreported at least 1 item affecting net income," Footnote 22 to the
Report indicates that this 68% estimate "includes misclassification
adjustments where a taxpayer reports the correct amount but on the wrong
line as well as the adjustments where the examiner zeroed out the entire
return." Consequently, it appears that simply reporting a deduction
amount on the wrong line would constitute "misrepmting" for purposes of
the 68% noncompliance rate, even though it had no impact on the S

corporation's taxable income or the overall tax liability of the S
cmporation's shareholders. This raises a serious question as to what
portion of the 68% "misreporting" percentage genuinely constitutes
noncompliance having an actual impact on income tax revenue.
Additionally, in the Preliminary Results of the 2003/2004 National
Research Program published at the IRS 2009 Research Conference held on
July 8, 2009, the indicated net misreporting percentages for S corporations
during tax years 2003 and 2004 were 12% and 16%, respectively. This
compares favorably with the overall compliance rate for all taxpayers
reported in the IRS Strategic Plan 2009-2013. In that Plan, the Voluntary
Compliance Rate for tax years 1985, 1992, 1998 and 2001 were reported
at between 83.6% to 84.6%. This implies a net misrepmting percentage of
15.4% to 16.4%, i.e., somewhat worse than the S corporation
noncompliance rate.
The second problem with the 68% "misreporting" percentage appears to
be one of scale. In a follow-up telephone conference with Thomas D.
Short of the GAO on January 21, 2010, Mr. Shmt indicated to Mr. Nichols
that he thought there was some form of "de minimis" exception, such as
$100, for which an item would not be treated as "misreported." Mr.
Nichols specifically asked Mr. Short whether this meant if an S
corporation reporting $10,000,000 of gross income incorrectly deducted
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$101 of expense, its retum would be included within the "misreporting"
category, and Mr. Short said he thought it would be. This obviously raises
serious questions regarding the validity of the 68% misreporting
percentage, and essentially would result in such statistic being of little
value. (If a misclassification constitutes "noncompliance" and there is not
a meaningful de minimis exception, it would not be surprising to find a
noncompliance rate of 100% on any type of income tax retum.)
Finally, it is impmiant to note that the Repmi cites deduction of ineligible
expenses as the most common etTor. Most certainly, this is not a problem
unique to S corporations, but is a problem which is just as prevalent, if not
more prevalent, in sole proprietorships, partnerships (including LLCs
taxed as partnerships), and C corporations.
It is impmiant to recognize that S corporation status is one of the most
popular vehicles for closely-held businesses, and as such, raising taxes on
such entities should never be considered lightly, and ce1iainly not on the
basis of statistics of questionable validity. Many of these same points
were made in a follow-up letter Mr. Nichols sent to the GAO dated
Janumy 12, 2010, shmily prior to issuance of the Report. In this regard,
the group believes that it is important for there to be at least one structure
whereby closely-held businesses can eam entrepreneurial profits and be
subject to only one level of tax without the imposition of social security
taxes (where such entrepreneurial profits are not attributable to labor).
Additionally, increasing marginal rates on such profits at this point in the
economic cycle is likely to be counterproductive, and even more so based
upon misleading statistics with respect to such entrepreneurs' tax
compliance. The critique of the GAO Repmi discussed above was set
forth in a letter dated February 9, 2010, from Stephen R. Looney and
Ronald A. Levitt to the Editor of Tax Notes which appeared in the
February 22, 2010 issue of Tax Notes Today.

In a letter dated Februmy 22, 2010 published in Tax Notes Today (Tax
Notes Today, March 8, 2010), Timothy P. Boling, Chief Quality Officer of
the GAO, responded to the criticism set forth above contending that the
GAO Report was "objective and fact based." Specifically, the letter stated
that the GAO did not seek to "change the substantive law relating to the
application of the self-employment tax to S corporations," properly
analyzed the IRS's National Research Program Study of S Corporation
Compliance in determining the misreporting percentage for S corporations
and dismissed the argument that the lack of a meaningful de minimis
exception raised serious questions regarding the validity of the 68%
misreporting percentage.

Interestingly, the letter additionally states that GAO did not say "S
corporations were abelTantly noncompliant" but instead provided the best
data available on compliance from the IRS and put it in context. In this
regard, the letter states that the noncompliance rate for sole proprietors in
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2001 was 70%, which actually exceeded the 68% noncompliance rate for
S corporations. One would expect a similar noncompliance rate for
partnerships and LLCs.
While the author appreciates the statements made in Mr. Boling's letter,
and certainly acknowledges that the GAO Report did not expressly state
that "S corporations were aberrantly noncompliant," the author believes
that the GAO Report has been misinterpreted (as the group suspected it
would be) to "vilify" S corporations. The author hopes that based upon
the group's comments as well as Mr. Boling's response on behalf of the
GAO, the Report will be considered in proper context such that it is clear
that S corporations are no more noncompliant with the tax law than sole
proprietorships, partnerships, LLCs or any other form of business entity.
However, the GAO Report may very well have been a significant factor in
the new Medicare tax imposed on certain shareholders' distributive share
of an S corporation's operating income under the recently passed health
insurance reform legislation, as well as the proposal to impose the selfemployment tax on ce1iain S corporations contained in The American Jobs
and Closing Tax Loopholes Act discussed immediately below.
13.

Section 413 of the American Jobs and Closing Tax Loopholes Act of
2010, H.R. 4213 (the "Act"), would have added new Section 1402(m) to
subject certain S corporation shareholders to the self-employment tax
imposed under Section 1402 on their distributive share of the income of an
S corporation. Specifically, Section 1402(m)(1)(a) would have provided
that in the case of any "disqualified S corporation," each shareholder of
such disqualified S corporation who provides "substantial services" with
respect to the "professional service business" referred to in Section
1402(m)(l)(C) must take into account such shareholder's pro rata share of
all items of income or loss described in Section 1366 which are
attributable to such business in dete1mining the shareholder's net eamings
from self-employment.
A disqualified S corporation would have been defined m Section
1402(m)(l)(C) as:
•

any S corporation which is a partner in a partnership which is engaged
in a professional service business if substantially all of the activities of
such S corporation are perfmmed in connection with such partnership;
and

•

any other S corporation which is engaged in a "professional service
business" if the "principal asset" of such business is the "reputation
and skill" of three or fewer employees.

Senator Baucus, on June 16, 2010, introduced a new substitute to the
House-passed bill which amends the S corporation provision.
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Unfortunately, the proposed change is minor and will not alter the hannful
impact of this provision. Specifically, the proposal as amended by Senator
Baucus would change the definition of a "disqualified S corporation" to
mean any other S corporation which is engaged in a professional service
business if "80% or more of the gross income of such business is
attributable to the service of three or fewer shareholders of such
cmporation."
Section 1402(m)(3) would have defined the term "professional service
business" as being any trade or business if substantially all of the activities
of such trade or business involve providing services in the fields of health,
law, lobbying, engineering, architecture, accounting, actuarial science,
performing arts, consulting, athletics, investment advice or management,
or brokerage services.
Except as otherwise provided by the Secretary, a shareholder's pro rata
share of items of the S corporation subject to the self-employment tax will
be increased by the pro rata share of such items of each member of such
shareholder's family (within the meaning of Section 318(a)(l)) who does
not provide substantial services with respect to such professional service
business.
Additionally, Section 1402(m)(2) would provide that in the case of any
partnership which is engaged in a professional service business, Section
1402(a)(13) -- which generally exempts limited partners from the selfemployment tax -- shall not apply to any partner who provides substantial
services with respect to such professional service business.
a.

Proposal is Too Broad and Unfairly Taxes Small Businesses
Complying with Law. Although the SBCA is certainly in
agreement with the Committee's desire to prevent taxpayers from
abusing the S corporation stmcture to avoid payroll taxes (by
means of paying unreasonably low compensation to shareholderemployees), this provision will clearly increase taxes on small
business owners who are fully complying with the law. This
provision does not narrowly close tax loopholes for taxpayers
abusing the system, but rather is a multi-billion dollar tax increase
on tax-compliant small businesses in the middle of the most
difficult economy the United States has faced since the Great
Depression.

b.

Proposal is Inconsistent with Long-Standing Policy. Historically,
employment taxes were intended to be imposed on income derived
from labor. The amendments made to Section 1402 by the Act
would apply not only to income derived from services performed
by shareholder-employees of S corporations subject to the Act, but
would also apply to income derived from capital by businesses
engaged in service businesses. For example, a medical practice
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may have made significant investments in MRI machines, X-Ray
equipment, CT scanners and related equipment, all of which reflect
capital investments by the owners that will generate profits not
derived by personal services performed by the shareholderemployees. Additionally, the proposal would subject an S
corporation's investment in "human capital" to payroll taxes. For
example, an S corporation conducting a medical practice may
invest substantial sums in the hiring and training of paraprofessional employees, such as nurse practitioners and physician
assistants, who will generate profits for the S corporation not
attributable to personal services perfmmed by the shareholderemployees. Existing case law clearly establishes the fact that
service businesses (regardless of the number of shareholders of
such business) may generate income from sources other than the
personal services of the shareholder-employees.
See, e.g.,
Richlands Medical Association v. Comm 'r, TCM 1990-66, aff'd
without published opinion, 953 F.2d 639 (4th Cir. 1992), and
Pediatric Surgical Associates, P. C. v. Comm 'r, TCM 2001-81. By
b1uning the line between income from labor and income from
capital, this provision will set the stage for future increases in
employment taxes on both service and non-service businesses and
mcome.
c.

Provision Contrary to Recently Enacted Health Reform Bill. The
new provision would also contradict and reverse the recent
decision made by Congress in the new health care reform law. The
Health Care and Reconciliation Act of 2010, H.R. 4872, PL 111152, imposes a 3.8% Medicare tax on the "net investment income"
of individual taxpayers having adjusted gross income of more than
$250,000 in the case of taxpayers filing a joint retum and more
than $200,000 for all other taxpayers. The term "net investment
income" is defined to include any gross income derived from a
trade or business if such trade or business is a passive activity
within the meaning of Section 469 with respect to the taxpayer.
Consequently, when Congress adopted the new 3.8% Medicare tax
on most fmms of investment income, it specifically exempted
active S cmporation sltareltolders and active limited partners.
This provision would effectively reverse that exclusion, subjecting
some active shareholders and active limited partners to the 2.9%
Medicare tax, and, if their income exceeds the $200,000/$250,000
thresholds, to the additional .9% Medicare tax under the Health
Care Bill. In other words, this provision would be a double tax
increase on a broad class of small businesses.

d.

IRS Already has Tools Necessary to Combat Abusive Situations.
The IRS already has all the necessary "tools" in place to combat
abusive situations where S corporations are paying their
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shareholder-employees umeasonably low compensation. The IRS
has been very successful in recharacterizing S corporation
distributions as wages subject to payroll taxes where taxpayers
have taken compensation that was less than reasonable. See, e.g.,
Rev. Rul. 74-44, 1974-1 C.B. 287; Radtke v. US., 895 F.2d 1196
(7th Cir. 1990); Spicer Accounting, Inc. v. US., 918 F.2d 80 (9th
Cir. 1990); Dunn & Clark, P.A. v. US., 853 F.Supp. 365 (D. Idaho
1994); and David E. Watson P.C. v. US., 668 F.3d 1008 (8th Cir.
2012), aff'g 757 F. Supp. 2d 877 (S.D. Iowa 2010). The answer to
stopping this abuse is for the IRS to do a better job enforcing
existing law, rather than for Congress to raise taxes on numerous S
corporations and shareholders, the large majority of whom who are
fully complying with the law. Additionally, the SBCA is not
aware of payroll tax abuses (actual or perceived) involving limited
partners of limited partnerships, so the inclusion of limited
partnerships in the provision is puzzling and appears misdirected.
e.

Provision Unfairly Discriminates Against Small Business. The
new provision arbitrarily discriminates against small businesses by
taxing S corporations with three or fewer key employees at higher
tax rates than S corporations that have four or more key
employees. There appears to be no good reason to put smaller
businesses at a competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis larger
businesses; they already lack economies of scale, and provisions
like this make it harder for them to compete and survive.

f.

Provision Inappropriately Taxes S Corporation Shareholders on
Other Family Members' Distributive Share of Income. The
provision will not only subject a shareholder who provides
"substantial services" to the S corporation to self-employment tax
on such shareholder's distributive share of the S corporation's
income, but also on the distributive share of the S corporation's
income attributable to any other family member who is also a
shareholder and who does not provide "substantial services".
Consequently, this provision will result in a shareholder being
subject to tax on income of other shareholders -- income to which
the shareholder being taxed is not entitled and does not receive
(i.e., "phantom income"). For example, assume that a medical
practice has as its shareholders a father who has conducted the
practice for many years and is now semi-retired. The father owns
99% of the stock of the S corporation, and his son, who does
provide substantial services, owns the remaining 1% of the stock
of the S corporation. In this situation, this new provision will
require the son to pay payroll taxes on 100% of the corporation's
income even though the son only owns 1% of the stock of the S
corporation and is only entitled to 1% of the funds distributed by
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the corporation to its shareholders. Such a result seems to unfairly
discriminate against family businesses.
g.

Provision Would Add Complexity to Tax Law. The new provision
would introduce a host of compliance issues, and would add
significant complexity and uncertainty for S corporations (and
limited partnerships) engaged in professional service businesses.
Key examples include:
(1)

The definition of the term "professional service business"
in the provision has, contrary to decades of prior statutory
tax law, been expanded to include lobbying, athletics,
investment advice or management, and brokerage services.
This arbitrarily exposes numerous closely-held businesses
to the self-employment tax without any prior notice. For
example, a two-person investment advisory firm or real
estate or insurance brokerage firm, will now be subject to a
more onerous tax scheme. This will certainly come as a
surprise to these small businesses. This certainly cannot be
justified on the basis of closing tax loopholes.

(2)

The provision uses the undefined tetm "substantial
services" numerous times. How do taxpayers determine
what substantial means? How will their advisors be able to
advise them on that point? Many taxpayers won't know
whether they owe the tax -- that type of uncertainty
undetmines our tax system, which is premised on voluntary
reporting and compliance.

(3)

The new provision would requireS corporations engaged in
a professional service business to determine whether its
principal asset is the "reputation and skill" (again,
undefined) of three or fewer employees.
S corporations engaged in a professional service business
would be required to get valuations of each of their assets
in order to determine their principal assets -- such a
valuation would be extremely difficult and expensive to
obtain, as assets such as reputation and skill are not easily
valued.
All of these questions will invite litigation, and are contrary
to the long-stated Congressional goal of tax simplification.
In addition to the complexity and uncertainty relating to the
new provision itself, the overall effect of the new provision
may well be to force small businesses into the much more
complex world of partnership taxation, which will not only
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be burdensome on these small businesses, but which also
presents numerous tax pitfalls for uninfonned small
businesses and, frankly, much greater potential for
manipulation by sophisticated taxpayers.
h.

Need for S Corporations for America's Small and Family-Owned
Businesses.
Finally, it is important to recognize that S
corporations are one of the most popular vehicles for small and
family-owned businesses, and as such, raising taxes on such
entities should never be considered lightly, and certainly not
without open and informed debate and analysis of the effects of
such taxes. There should be at least one structure whereby small
and family-owned businesses can eam entrepreneurial profits
subject to only one level of tax and not be subject to unlimited
payroll taxes.
After several unsuccessful attempts at passage of the American
Jobs and Closing Tax Loopholes Act of 2010, the extenders bill
with the controversial S corporation offset was defeated.

19

14.

On December 17, 2010, President Obama signed into law the Tax Relief,
Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization and Job Creation Act of 2010,
which departs from its immediate predecessor, the American Jobs and
Closing Tax Loopholes Act of 2010, most notably in that it does not
impose self-employment payroll taxes on the pass-through income of S
corporation shareholders.

15.

The issue of S corporation income and distributions not being subject to
FICA or self-employment taxes, whereas wages paid by S corporations to
their shareholder-employees are subject to FICA taxes, continues to be a
political "hot potato." With the release of Newt Gingrich's tax retum, a
strong contingent of politicians once again brought to the forefront the socalled "John Edwards Tax Dodge," claiming that S corporations are being
used to allow their shareholders to avoid large payroll taxes. As was
19
discussed in more detail in an article that appeared in Tax Notes Today,
whether Newt Gingrich's structure is abusive, is far from clear, and the
IRS itself has been schizophrenic in its pursuit of so-called abusive
situations. For example, with C corporations, the IRS will maintain that
the income is a dividend rather than wages so that it can maximize the
double tax that C corporations are subject to, whereas with S corporations,
the IRS will claim that the income is wages rather than dividend
distributions so that it can collect FICA taxes.

See, "Shades of John Edwards in Gingrich Return," 2012 TNT 15-2 (1/24/2012).
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16.

In response to the release of Newt Gingrich's tax retums, Representative
Pete Stark introduced a bill on January 31, 2012 entitled the "NaiTowing
Exceptions for Withholding Taxes" ("NEWT") Act. 20

17.

The "Stop Student Loan Interest Rate Hike Act of 2012" (S. 2343), as
originally proposed by Senate Majority Leader HalTy Reid, on April 24,
2012, would have required taxpayers with incomes of more than $250,000
to pay employment taxes on income received from an S corporation or
limited partnership interest in a professional services business. This bill
differs from the NEWT Act by adding the $250,000 income threshold and
by applying only to businesses that derive 75 percent oftheir income from
personal services, but is otherwise very similar to the bill proposed by
Rep. Pete Stark. Representative Charles Rangel reintroduced the "NEWT"
Act on January 22, 2013. The provision imposing self-employment tax on
S corporations was ultimately removed from the Act.

18.

Recently, a copy of a list of tax breaks which Democrats are targeting for
savings as part of the Joint Conference Committee on the Budget was
obtained by Tax Analysts. 21 The list highlights the so-called "S corp
loophole," which the Budget Committee states "is a loophole . . . that
allows certain wealthy professionals to avoid paying payroll taxes on their
eamings." The report also refers to the loophole as the "Newt
Gingrich/John Edwards" loophole and states that it is "used by owners of
S corporations to avoid the 3.9% [sic] Medicare Tax on eamings, which
costs taxpayers hundreds of millions of dollars every year." The amount
of the tax is actually 3.8% rather than 3.9% as cited in the report.

19.

The "Tax Reform Act of 2014" (discussion draft), released on February
26, 2014, by House Ways and Means Chairman, Dave Camp (R-MI) (the
"Camp Proposal"), includes a shocking change which imposes the selfemployment tax ("SECA") on S corporation shareholders who materially
participate in their businesses within the meaning of Section 469. The
Camp Proposal generally subjects 70% of the combined compensation and
the distributive share of an S corporation's (or partnership's) combined
and distributive share of the entity's income as net earnings from selfemployment subject to FICA or SECA, as applicable. Under present law,
S corporations are required to pay "reasonable compensation" to their
shareholder-employees, which is subject to FICA, but neither the income
that passes through to the shareholders (Rev. Rul. 59-221, 1959-1 CB 225)
or dividend distributions (Section 1402(a)(2)) made by an S corporation to
its shareholders is subject to FICA or SECA (or the new 3.8% tax imposed
on net investment income under Section 1411 provided that the S
corporation shareholder materially participates in the trade or business
conducted by the S corporation). Consequently, under cuiTent law, the
profits of an S corporation which are distributed to its shareholders as

See "Stark Introduces Bill to Remove Self-Employment 'Tax Dodge'," 2012 TNT 21-37 (1/31/2012).
See "Democrats List Targets for Elimination in Budget Talks," 2013 TNT 217-1 (Nov. 8, 2013).
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dividends are not subject to FICA or SECA taxes provided that the S
corporation is paying reasonable compensation to its shareholderemployees for the services they are actually rendering to the S
.
22
corporatiOn.
While there certainly is a reasonable argument that different rules in the
self-employment tax area should not apply to limited partners versus LLC
members versus S corporation shareholders (despite the fact that there any
many other provisions of the Code that benefit partnerships and LLCs that
don't benefit S corporations and thus are not applied unif01mly among
pass-through entities as a whole), the imposition of the self-employment
tax on 70% of the total amount of compensation and distributive share of
an entity's income is completely arbitrarl 3 and not at all consistent with
the purpose of FICA and SECA, which is to impose a tax on income
derived from personal services actually rendered by an individual.
Well developed law as to what constitutes "reasonable compensation" has
provided the IRS with a successful tool for attacking abusive situations
and recharacterizing S corporation distributions as wages subject to FICA
in appropriate circumstances. Consequently, if any mle is to be applied
unif01mly to all pass-through entities, it should be the rule currently in
effect for S corporations providing that only reasonable compensation paid
for services rendered by the owners for services they actually render to the
entity should be subject to SECA or FICA.
The author believes that Representative Camp's proposal would have a
crippling effect on many small businesses which utilize pass-through
entities (which overwhelmingly outnumber C corporations), and gives no
credit whatsoever to the large capital investments many of these passthrough entities, such as those in the manufacturing sector, have made in
their businesses. Representative Camp's proposal on this issue is
completely arbitrary and totally inequitable to pass-through entities,
especially S corporations, which have been formed with increasing
frequency by taxpayers to conduct their businesses in reliance upon the
rules currently in effect regarding application of SECA and FICA to S
corporations and their shareholders.
20.

In a report dated July 31, 2014, the "Citizens for Tax Justice" urged
adoption of the provision in President Obama's most recent budget plan,
which generally imposes the self-employment tax on all businesses
providing professional services, whether structured as S corporations,
partnerships or LLCs.

22

See generally, Looney and Levitt, "Reasonable Compensation Issues for Closely-Held and Service Corporations,"
61stNYU Ann. Inst. Fed. Tax'n, 16 (2003).
23
The Camp Proposal's provision on self-employment income is more onerous than the predecessor provisions
proposing to impose self-employment tax on certain small service S corporations. See Looney, "Finding Loopholes
in ClosingS Corp Loopholes," 2013 TNT 227-12 (November 25, 2013).
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H.

APPLICATION OF SOCIAL SECURITY TAXES
INVESTMENT INCOME TAX TO S CORPORATIONS

AND

NET

A number of commentators have recently made potentially negative comments
regarding non-wage distributions from "personal service" S corporations being
one of the few paths to receive income untouched by the FICA tax, SelfEmployment (SE) tax or new Net Investment Income (Nil) tax. 24
First of all it's important to recognize that non-wage distributions from a nonpersonal service corporation, such as a manufacturing company, are also not
subject to these taxes (including the Nil tax if the shareholder materially
participates in the business). It is also important to recognize that with respect to
personal service S corporations, the IRS and the courts can and have
recharacterized nonwage distributions as ''wages'' subject to the FICA tax where
umeasonably low compensation is being paid to the S corporation shareholders,
so that personal service S corporations may not "avoid" the FICA tax on
amounts distributed as dividends if they are in substance wages (see Radtke,
Spicer Accounting, and the Watson case).
Additionally, both the IRS and the courts expressly recognize that a so-called
personal service corporation may indeed produce eamings that are properly
characterized as dividend distributions rather than wages (see the recent Mulcahy
case, as well as the Pediatric Surgical Associates and the Richlands Medical
Association cases). Quite simply, the FICA and SE taxes were meant to only
apply to wages of an individual for personal services he or she actually renders,
and not to active operating income (profits) of a business paid out as dividend
distributions to shareholders. On the other hand, the Nil tax was meant to
subject certain higher income taxpayers to the 3.8% tax on passive type
investment income, not to the profits of a business in which they materially
participate. Consequently, any suggestion that the use of S corporations to
"avoid" these three taxes is abusive or a "loophole" simply misses the mark as
entrepreneurial profits of a business not attributable to wages paid for personal
services actually rendered by a shareholder were never intended to be subject to
any of these three taxes.
It is also interesting to note that in a recent study, 25 the study found that S

corporation shareholders pay the highest effective tax rate of any type of entity.
In particular, the study found that S corporation shareholders pay an effective tax
rate of 31.6%, partners of partnerships (which would include limited liability
companies taxed as partnerships) pay an effective tax rate of 29.4%, C
corporations pay an effective tax rate of 17.8% and that non-farm sole
proprietorships pay an effective tax rate of 15.1 %. Consequently, it appears that S
corporation shareholders are actually paying more than their fair share of taxes,
24

I

See Shamik Trivedi, Jeremiah Coder, and Jaime Arora, "Practitioners Busy With Net Investment Income Tax
Regs," Tax Notes, Dec. 10,2012, p. 1149, Doc 2012-25152,2012 TNT 234-1.
25
"Report Finds S Corporations Face Highest Effective Tax Rate," 2013 TNT 153-50 (Aug. 8, 2013). The report is
entitled "Entity Choice and Effective Tax Rates," and was prepared by Quantria Strategies, LLC.
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and it would be inherently unfair to impose additional employment taxes on them
under the guise of closing a tax loophole. Rather, such a provision would very
likely have a substantial negative effect on the economic recovery of America's
small businesses following the Great Recession.
Several comments were also made that the Nil tax would probably not cause
taxpayers to change their business stmctures to S corporations. The fact is,
according to recently published IRS statistics, the number of entities filing S
corporation retums ah'eady exceeds the number of entities filing retums as
partnerships, and the IRS projects that the gap in the number of entities filing as S
corporations versus partnerships will continue to grow in the future (See,
Document 6292, Office of Research, Analysis and Statistics, Fiscal Year Retum
Projections for the United States: 2013-2020, Rev. Fall 2013). Consequently, S
corporations are ah·eady one of the most popular types of stmctures for small
businesses, and the new tax on Nil should reinforce that.
Finally, although it may be possible for an LLC member or limited partner to
materially participate so that his or her distributive share of income would not be
subject to the Nil tax, that would likely result in that member's or partner's
distributive share of the income of the LLC or partnership being subject to the SE
tax (Renkemeyer, Howell andRiether), including the increased 3.8% Medicare tax
imposed on the self-employment income of higher income taxpayers. The correct
answer here does not have so much to do with defining what a limited partner is
for SE or Nil tax purposes, but rather to apply the test used in the S corporation
area, a reasonable compensation test, to LLCs and partnerships.
I.

SOCIAL SECURITY TAXES ON S CORPORATIONS OPERATED
THROUGH LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES
In those situations in which S corporations are the choice of entity for federal tax
purposes, it still may be preferable for a number of non-tax reasons to operate for
state law purposes as an LLC. One important issue is whether an LLC which has
elected to be taxed as an S corporation for federal income tax purposes will also
be taxed as an S corporation for Social Security tax purposes rather than as a
partnership.
An LLC which has elected to be taxed as an S corporation should be subject to the
same Social Security tax mles to which S corporations are subject rather than to
the self-employment tax mles to which partnerships are subject.
Some practitioners have cited Reg. §1.1402(a)-2(f) as requiring an entity which
elects not to be treated as a partnership for federal income tax purposes to
nevertheless be treated as a partnership for self-employment ta.:-c purposes.
Specifically, Reg. § 1.1402(a)-2(f) states that "an organization described in the
preceding sentence [defining a "partnership"] shall be treated as a partnership for
the purposes of the tax on self-employment income even though such
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organization has elected, pursuant to Section 1361 and the regulations thereunder,
to be taxed as a domestic corporation."26
However, it should be noted that the reference in Reg. §1.1402(a)-2(f) to Section
1361 is actually a reference to Section 1361 as in effect prior to its repeal in 1966
by Pub. L. No. 89-389, Section 4(b)(1), April 14, 1966, 80 Stat. 116, which
formerly permitted some unincorporated entities to elect to be taxed as domestic
corporations. Following the repeal of this former Section 1361, Congress did not
"retire" this section number, but many years later (in 1982) used it again for
Subchapter S corporations. Consequently, it does not appear that this regulation
in any manner would cause an LLC which has elected to be taxed as an S
corporation to be subject to the self-employment tax as if it were a partnership.

IV.

UNREASONABLY HIGH COMPENSATION AND S CORPORATIONS
A.

INTRODUCTION
One area in which an S corporation could potentially face a challenge by the IRS
for unreasonably high compensation relates to the "taxable income" limitation
under the built-in gain tax imposed by Section 1374.

B.

GENERAL BUILT-IN GAIN TAX RULES
Section 1374 imposes a corporate-level tax on the built-in gains of S corporations
that were previously C corporations. Section 1374 as originally enacted applies to
built-in gains recognized by a corporation during the 10-year period following
such corporation's conversion to S status. Section 1374(d)(7). Reg. §11374-1(d)
provides that the recognition period is the ten-calendar year period, and not the
ten-tax year period, beginning on the first day the corporation is an S corporation
or the day an S corporation acquires assets under Section 1374(d)(8) in a
carryover basis transaction. The tax rate is presently 35% (the highest rate of tax
imposed under Section 11(b)) of the S corporation's "net recognized built-in
gain." Section 1374(b)(1).
On September 27, 2010, President Obama signed into law the Small Business
Jobs Act of 2010, H.R. 5297. Section 2014 of the Act amends Section 1374 to
provide for the reduction of the recognition period during which corporations that
converted from C corporation status to S corporation status are subject to the
built-in gain tax from 10 years to 5 years for taxable years beginning in 2011.
Specifically, the text of the amendment is very similar to the temporary reduction
from 10 years to 7 years made by the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act
of 2009. Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115 (2/17/2009) The text of the
amendment reads as follows:

26

See also, McKee, Nelson and Whitmire, Federal Taxation of Partnerships and Partners (4th Ed. 2007),
which states that "a partnership that elects not to be treated as a partnership under Subchapter K
apparently is nevertheless treated as a partnership for purposes of Section 1402."

~9.02[5](b ),
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(b) Special Rules for 2009, 2010 and 2011. - No tax shall be
imposed on the net recognized built-in gain of an S corporation (i) in the case of any taxable year beginning in 2009 or 2010, if the
7th taxable year in the recognition period preceded such taxable
year, or (ii) in the case of any taxable year beginning in 2011, if the
5th year in the recognition period preceded such taxable year.
The amendment is applicable to taxable years beginning after December 31, 2010,
and generally raises the same questions as were raised in connection with the
reduction from 10 years to 7 years for taxable years beginning in 2009 and 2010.
For a discussion of these issues, see Looney and Levitt, "Reasonable
Compensation and The Built-In Gains Tax," 68 NYU Fed. Tax. Inst.,
115.05[1][a], [b]. [c] and [d] (2010). However, it should be noted that the
proposed amendment specifically uses the term "taxable year" in com1ection with
the recognition period for taxable years beginning in2009 and 2010, but only uses
the te1m "5th year" (not taxable year) in connection with the recognition period
for a taxable year beginning in 2011. This appears to resolve any ambiguity
created by the previous amendment and clarifies that for dispositions in 2009 and
2010, 7 tax years (including short tax years) need to have transpired prior to the
year of disposition for the built-in gain tax not to apply to such dispositions, and
that for dispositions in 2011, 2012 and 2013, 5 calendar years need to have
transpired prior to the year of disposition for the built-in gain tax not to apply to
such dispositions. 27
The American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 similarly reduced the recognition
period for dispositions made in 2012 and 2013 to 5 (calendar) years.
Additionally, the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 clarified that if the 5year recognition period is satisfied for a disposition occUlTing in 2012 or 2013,
such sale will not be subject to the built-in gain tax even if the purchase price will
be received over a period of years under the installment sales method.
The Camp Proposal reduces (permanently) the 10-year recognition period for the
imposition ofbuilt-in gain tax imposed under Section1374 to five years, effective
for tax years beginning after 2013.
On June 12, 2014, the House passed H.R. 4453, the S Corporation Tax Relief Act
of 2014, which permanently reduces the recognition period under the BIG tax to 5
years and also permanently extends the basis adjustment for S corporations
donating appreciated property. Hopefully the Senate will follow suit and this Bill
(or a similar Bill) will be signed into law by President Obama.
27

The differences between the express statutory language and the Committee Reports accompanying the 2009 Act
raised the issue of whether Congress actually intended to use tax years rather than calendar years in measuring the 7year recognition period. In fact, Section 2(h) of the Tax Technical Corrections Act of 2009, H.R. 4169, 111
Congress, 1st Session, which was introduced on December 2, 2009, but which did not pass, would have changed the
phrase "7th taxable year" to "7th year" in Section 1374(d)(7)(B) retroactively for tax years beginning after 2008.
With the passage of the Small Business Jobs Act of2010, it appears that Congress has conceded that tax years will
apply to the special 7-year rule applicable to dispositions in 2009 and 2010 but that calendar years will be used for
the special 5-year rule applicable to dispositions made in 2011.
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C.

TAXABLE-INCOME LIMITATION
In addition to the limitation placed on the aggregate amount of net built-in gains
that may be recognized by an S corporation under the NUBIG limitation, the
taxable-income limitation limits the amount of net built-in gains recognized by an
S corporation on an annual basis. Because a corporation's taxable income may
serve as the base for the built-in gains tax, the maximum amount of net built-in
gains (built-in gains less built-in losses) that must be recognized by an S
corporation in a particular tax year within the BIG Period is limited to the amount
of the corporation's taxable income for such year (the taxable-income limitation).
Section 1374(d)(2)(A)(ii) and Reg. §1.1374-2(a)(2).
Any recognized built-in gain that is not subject to the built-in gains tax because of
the taxable income limitation must be carried forward and is subject to the built-in
gains tax in the S corporation's succeeding tax years during the recognition period
to the extent that it subsequently has other taxable income (that is not already
subject to the built-in gains tax) for any tax year within the BIG Period. Section
1374(d)(2)(B), as amended by Section 1006(f)(5) of the Technical and
Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988 (TAMRA), Pub. L. No. 100-647, 102 Stat.
3342 (1988). This modification reduced potential manipulation of timing postconversion losses to avoid the built-in gains tax on the corporation's NUBIG, and
applies only to corporations filingS elections on or after March 31, 1988.

D.

ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE PLANNING OPPORTUNITIES
1.

General. Because the accounts receivable of a cash-basis corporation are
included in determining a corporation's NUBIG, and the collection of
such receivables is treated as a recognized built-in gain under Section
1374, the cash-basis corporation, and particularly the cash-basis service
corporation, is potentially subject to a substantial tax liability under
Section 1374. Consequently, it is imperative that the cash-basis service
corporation converting from C corporation status to S corporation status
consider all available planning opportunities to minimize the impact of the
built-in gains tax with respect to its accounts receivable.

2.

Zeroing Out of Taxable Income. Since the base of the built-in gain tax
is limited to a corporation's taxable income, one method of avoiding the
built-in gain tax would be to zero out the corporation's taxable income for
the entire 10-year built-in gain period. Such a strategy seems inadvisable
in that it could very well subject the S corporation to the same
unreasonable compensation arguments to which it would have been
subject had it remained a C corporation. An S corporation would be
susceptible to an umeasonable compensation argument in this context
since the result of recharacterizing amounts paid as compensation to the
shareholder-physicians as distributions would be to increase the
corporation's taxable income above zero, and thus, subject it to the built-in
gain tax.
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3.

Bonus Accrual Method. An altemative method of avoiding the built-ingain tax on the accounts receivable of a cash basis taxpayer is to accrue
bonuses (in an amount equal to its receivables) to its shareholderemployees in its last tax year as a C corporation and pay such bonuses to
its shareholder-employees during the first two and one-half (2-1/2) months
of its first tax year as an S corporation. Although there are a number of
open issues with regard to this strategy, Ltr. Rul. 200925005 confirms that
this strategy does work.
In Ltr. Rul. 200925005, the IRS ruled that the payment of ce1iain salary
expenses and other outstanding costs relating to the production of the
outstanding accounts receivable of the corporation at the time of its
conversion to S status would constitute built-in deduction items,
specifically including the payment of compensation to shareholderemployees of the corporation within the first two and one-half months
following the corporation's conversion to S corporation status.
Under the facts of the ruling, the taxpayer is a cash basis C corporation
with a calendar tax year. The corporation is a personal service corporation
which is wholly-owned by a number of professionals. The corporation
bills its clients for the services performed by the professionals and when
invoices are paid, the corporation pays salaries and wages to the
professionals. Additionally, the corporation has other employees, such as
non-shareholder clerical staff and non-shareholder professionals to which
it pays wages.
The taxpayer will elect to be an S corporation and will have built-in gain
from its outstanding accounts receivable. The taxpayer requested the
letter ruling to dete1mine whether certain salary expenses and other
outstanding costs relating to the production of the outstanding accounts
receivable as of the date of the corporation's conversion to S status will
qualify as built-in losses under Section 1374, and specifically, whether the
amounts paid to its shareholder-employees within the first two and onehalf months of the recognition period under Section 1374 of salary and
wage expenses that are related to the production of accounts receivable
that are outstanding as of the effective date of the S election will constitute
built-in deduction items under Section 1374(d)(5)(B).
The post-conversion collection of accounts receivable of a cash-basis
corporation, particularly the cash-basis service corporation, is potentially
subject to a substantial tax liability for the built-in gain tax imposed under
Section 1374. Due to the pass-through nature of an S corporation, the
collection of accounts receivable by a cash-basis corporation that has
converted from C corporation status to S corporation status, absent proper
planning, will result in a forced double taxation on such receivables of
approximately 60.74%? 8 Consequently, it is imperative that the cash-
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basis service corporation converting from C corporation status to S
corporation status consider all available planning opportunities to
minimize the impact of the built-in gain tax with respect to its accounts
receivable.
Since built-in deduction items (such as accounts payable of cash-basis
corporations) are taken into account in determining NUBIG of an S
corporation under Section 1374(d)(5)(C), and the payment of such
amounts is treated as a recognized built-in loss that may be matched
against built-in income items (such as a cash-basis corporation's accounts
receivable), a common method that has been employed by practitioners to
avoid the built-in gain tax imposed on the accounts receivable of a cash
basis service corporation is to accme bonuses (in an amount equal to its
collectible receivables) to its shareholder-employees in its last tax year as
a C corporation and pay such bonuses to its shareholder-employees in its
first tax year as an S corporation. Even though such accmed bonuses may
or may not be characterized as built-in deduction items (depending on
whether they are paid in the first two and one-half months following
conversion), the effect of accming such bonuses nevertheless may be
either to eliminate the potential application of the built-in gain tax
altogether by reducing the corporation's NUBIG to zero, or alternatively,
if the corporation has goodwill or other appreciated assets, to at least
minimize recognition of any built-in gains by reducing the corporation's
NUBIG by the amount of such accmed bonuses. There are a number of
open issues regarding the mechanics of accming such bonuses. These
open issues include:
•

whether such bonuses should be paid within the first two and one-half
months so as to constitute built-in deduction items that offset the
built-in income items (receivables), or whether such bonuses may be
paid at any time during the corporation's first taxable year as an S
corporation based on the position that the accmed bonuses reduce the
corporation's NUBIG to zero;

•

if the corporation intends to pay such bonuses in cash within the first
two and one-half months and funds must be borrowed to pay such
bonuses, whether the corporation or the shareholder-employees
should borrow such funds;

•

whether such bonuses could be paid by simply having the corporation
distribute the accounts receivable attributable to the accmed bonuses
within the first two and one-half months following conversion to S
corporation status (as opposed to paying such bonuses out in cash);

28

Assuming $100 of accounts receivable, the built-in gain tax would be $35 ($100 x 35%), and the shareholderlevel tax (assuming the maximum marginal individual tax rate of 39.6%) would be $25.74 ($65 x 39.6%). Thus,
total taxes on the $100 of accounts receivable would be $60.74 ($35 + $25.74), resulting in an effective federal tax
rate of 60.74%. In addition, state corporate income taxes may be imposed on the corporate level gain.
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•

whether the regular salaries of the shareholder-employees should be
"suspended" in order to enable the corporation to pay such bonuses;

•

assessment of the effect of such bonuses on any buy-out provision in
the event a shareholder-employee's employment is terminated after
receipt of the bonus but prior to any loans funding such bonus being
repaid;

•

whether the employment agreements of the shareholder-employees
should be amended to provide compensation for nonbillable services
to suppoti compensation paid in "C" years as well as accmal of the
bonus;

•

documentation of such accmed bonuses in the minutes of the board of
directors as compensation for past services; and

•

whether the corporation should continue zeroing out its taxable
income for some period of time in order to support compensation
amounts paid in prior "C" years as well as to provide a "back-up" for
the bonus accmal strategy.

Although Ltr. Rul. 200925005 certainly does not answer all of these open
questions, it certainly makes it clear that the built-in gain tax on accounts
receivable can be avoided by the converted corporation paying out
compensation related to such accounts receivable to its shareholderemployees within the first two and one-half months of the corporation's
first tax year as an S corporation, which is the method that has been most
commonly employed by practitioners in order to avoid imposition of the
built-in gain tax on the accounts receivable of a cash basis service
corporation.
The IRS expressly concludes in the mling that the taxpayer's payments to
its shareholder-employee of salary and wages relating to the production of
accounts receivable on the effective date of the S election, if paid in the
first two and one-half months of the recognition period, qualify as builtin loss items under Section 1374(d)(5)(B). Additionally, the IRS found
that the taxpayer's payments to its non-shareholder employees of salary
and wages related to the production of outstanding accounts receivable on
the effective date of the S election, if paid at any time during the
recognition period, will qualify as built-in loss items under Section
1374(d)(5)(B). Finally, the IRS concluded that the taxpayer's payments of
other unpaid payable expenses and accounts payable related to the
production of the accounts receivable outstanding on the effective date of
the S election, if paid at any time during the recognition period, would
qualify as built-in loss items under Section 1374(d)(5)(B).
It is interesting to note that Ltr. Rul. 200925005 did not specifically state

that any type of special bonus had to be accmed prior to the last day of the
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corporation's last tax year as a C corporation or require any written
evidence of such accrual in the corporate minutes or other documentation.
Rather, the IRS simply concluded that the payment of salary and wages to
the shareholder-employees of the corporation which related to the
production of the accounts receivable on the effective date of the S
election would qualify as built-in loss items if paid in the first two and
one-half months of the recognition period. To be certain, the author would
recommend that such bonus be accrued prior to the last tax year as a C
corporation and evidenced at least in the Board of Director minutes of the
corporation.
4.

Acceleration of Accounts Receivable. Another method of avoiding
forced double taxation on its receivables, is for the cash basis service
corporation converting from C to S corporation status to accelerate its
receivables income and recognize such income prior to conversion to S
corporation status. In this manner, the corporation may be able to defer
(possibly indefinitely) shareholder-level tax on its receivables until the
earnings and profits generated by the collection of such receivables are
distributed to the corporation's shareholders.
The recognition of
receivables income by a corporation prior to its conversion to S
corporation status will have the added benefit of decreasing its overall
NUBIG. The pre-conversion recognition of receivables income may be
achieved in at least three ways.

First, the corporation may simply assign and sell its accounts receivable
prior to its conversion to S corporation status to a third party.
Second, the corporation may sell its accounts receivable to its shareholderemployees prior to its conversion to S corporation status. Additionally, in
each of the first two alternatives, the sale of the receivables could be
combined with the payment of a bonus in an amount equal to the sales
proceeds in order to avoid payment of a corporate level tax on the
corporation's sale of its receivables.
Finally, the corporation could, in order to avoid a pre-conversion C
corporation tax on the sale of its accounts receivable, simply "bonus" its
accounts receivable to its shareholder-employees. The pre-conversion
recognition of receivables income by a service corporation, when
combined with the payment of a colTesponding bonus to its shareholderemployees, should also limit any attempts by the IRS to recharacterize
payments to the corporation's shareholder-employees as dividend
distributions under unreasonable compensation arguments to the
corporation's last tax year as a C corporation.
5.

Summary of Accounts Receivable Planning Alternatives. The zeroing
out of an S corporation's taxable income in order to avoid the built-in gain
tax could very well subject the S corporation to the traditional
unreasonably high compensation arguments to which C corporations are
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subject. Thus, a better method to avoid the built-in gain tax is to accrue a
bonus in an amount equal to receivables in its final C year. This method
also produces the lowest amount of tax and the greatest amount of defenal
on the entire amount of tax due (provided the corporation has no other
built-in gain items).
Alternatively, the sale of the corporation's
receivables prior to its conversion to S corporation status will accelerate
the corporate level tax due on the receivables, but may result in an
indefinite defenal of the shareholder level tax on the earnings and profits
generated by the sale of the receivables. The sale of receivables in a cashbasis service corporation's last C year with a conesponding bonus in the
amount of its receivables or the bonus of its receivables will result in a
single level of tax and a one year acceleration of income in comparison to
the bonus accrual alternative. The alternatives involving the sale or bonus
of the cash-basis service corporation's receivables in its last C year also
have the added benefit of limiting any unreasonable compensation
arguments to its last year as a C corporation, rather than exposing the
corporation to such an argument in years following its conversion to S
corporation status when the corporation may be subject to the built-in
gains tax imposed under Section 1374.
Consequently, the tax practitioner must analyze the specific facts and
circumstances of each situation, including the total compensation package
othetwise being paid to the shareholder-employees of the corporation in its
last year as a C corporation, in order to determine the optimal planning
alternative regarding the cash-basis service corporation's receivables. In
no event, however, should the cash-basis service corporation merely
convert to S corporation status without engaging in any planning to
minimize the built-in gains tax which will be imposed under Section 1374
on such corporation's receivables.
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